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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
This dissertation is comprised of three essays entitled: "Statistical Discrimination
and the Implications of Employer-Employee Racial Matches," "Gender Wage Gap:
Does Employers Gender Matter?," and "Ranking Journals: Show me the Money."
The rst essay studies the empirical validity of a statistical discrimination model
that incorporates employers race. The theory of statistical discrimination states that,
at hiring, an employer does not observe an employees true productivity but instead
uses the employees average group productivity as an indicator of the individual em-
ployees productivity. For example, if an employer has to decide between two identical
potential employees and it just happens that one employee is white while the other
is black, then the employer is more likely to bid a higher wage on the white em-
ployee just because the employer thinks that, on average, white employees are more
productive.
Previous literature that empirically tested the implications of a statistical discrim-
ination model focused mostly on the race of the employee only (Altonji and Pierret
2001, Oettinger 1996). In this essay, I build a model that takes into account the
employers race. I then test whether employers statistically discriminate less against
employees that share the same racial background than they do against employees
from a di¤erent race.1 To incorporate the employers race into a statistical discrimi-
1An employee statistically discriminates less against one group if the wage assignment correlates less
with the employees group average productivity.
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nation model, I assume that communication is better between the employer and the
employee if the two share the same racial background. This assumption is based on
evidence from previous literature, especially from psychology.
From the theoretical model, I generate two predictions to test empirically. The
rst prediction states that the correlation between the employees unobserved skill
level and the wage is greater if the employee and the employer share the same racial
background than if they do not. This prediction excludes taste for discrimination
(Becker (1971)), since the e¤ect of taste for discrimination shows in the average wage
and not in the correlation between skill and wage. The second prediction states that,
if there are enough minority employers, a high skill minority employee is more likely
to select himself into a same race employer.
To test these predictions, I use data from the National Longitudinal Survey of
Youth 1997 (NLSY97). The data contains information on the supervisors race, which
is used as a proxy for the employer. In addition, NLSY97 contains test scores that
are used to calculate the Armed Force Qualication Test (AFQT). The AFQT is not
observed directly by employers and is used in the analysis as a measure of skill.2 In
the empirical section, I regress log wage on AFQT and other controls and test whether
the coe¢ cient on AFQT for employees that share the same racial background as the
employers is greater than the coe¢ cient on AFQT for employees that are from a
di¤erent race.
Given the wage schedules, there is a potential selection bias that should be ad-
2Neal and Johnson (1996) show that AFQT is a good proxy for pre-market skill level using data from
NLSY79 for the years 1990-1991. Since in this Chapter I use a sample from NLSY97, which contains
di¤erent responders, and the data is taken for the year 2007, I report the analysis from Neal and
Johnson in this Chapter.
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dressed in the estimations. That is, the selection of employees to employers is not
random and it depends on the employeesskill level. Because a high skill employee is
more likely to accept a higher wage o¤er from a same race employer that can better
read his productivity, the selection of employees to employers is not random. There-
fore, there is a sample selection bias which I address in the estimations by using the
maximum likelihood Heckman sample selection technique.
My ndings mainly support the hypothesis that employers statistically discrimi-
nate less against same race employees. I nd evidence to support this prediction for
both white and black employees. However, only 6% of white employees have a non-
white employer, whereas 63% of the minority employees are employed by a di¤erent
race employer. In addition, the results do not show a large selection of high skilled
employees to a same race employer. Therefore, the results suggest that even though
a high skill minority employee is more likely to receive a higher wage o¤er from the
same race employer, there are not enough minority employers that o¤er high skill jobs
to accommodate the supply. As a result, a high skill black employee might be forced
to accept a lower wage o¤er from a white employer, because he cannot nd a black
employer.
These ndings provide evidence that policy makers can reduce the racial wage gap
by focusing on a¢ rmative action programs that help minorities become employers
and/or programs which provide cultural sensitivity training for employers to improve
cross-race communication.
The second essay picks up on the ndings from the rst essay and tests whether
the results from the racial wage gap apply to the gender wage gap. That is, I test
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whether the sex of the employer explains part of the gender wage gap.
The sample is collected from the NLSY97 with the same criteria as the sample
used in the rst essay. However, because the focus of this essay is on the gender wage
gap, the sample is limited to white employees and employers.
The paper is mainly related to the literature that explains the gender wage gap due
to di¤erences between the sexesreturns to skill. That is, if an employer of one gender
has more information about the employees underlying skill level than an employer
of another gender, then the return for skill is di¤erent between genders of employers.
This di¤erence might explain the di¤erences in the return for skill between genders
of employees if there are not enough female employers, as the sample suggests.
The main nding suggests that there is no evidence that an employer of one gender
better observes an employees underling skill level than an employer of the opposite
sex. This result is a contrary to the ndings in the rst essay that tested the racial
wage gap. The intuition for the results in the rst essay is that communication is
better when two parties share the same racial background than if they do not. In
addition, because social networks are often racially stratied, an employer is more
likely to have more information about a potential employee with the same racial
background. Therefore, additional information might ow through the social network.
The motivations for the racial wage gap, however, are most likely not transferable
to the gender wage gap. Social networks are not gender stratied in the way that they
are racially stratied. In addition, communication may not vary based on whether or
the not the two parties share the same sex. This does not mean that employers do
not statistically discriminate against one gender, just that statistical discrimination
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does not vary based on the employers gender.
The results have important implications for programs that focus on closing wage
gaps. In particular, programs that help reduce the racial wage gap might not be as
e¤ective in reducing the gender wage gap. For example, a few studies suggest that fe-
male employees are less likely to be promoted relative to comparable male employees
(see McDowell et al. (1999), Sampson and Moore (2008), Jellala et al. (2008), Arulam-
palam et al. (2007)). A¢ rmative action programs that provide incentives to promote
female employees and minority employees are likely to yield greater reductions in the
racial wage gap. As with minority average wage, female average wage will increase
when more women are in higher level positions; however, female employees will not
derive the additional benet from improved communication with their employers that
would be seen with minority employees
The third essay is a joint work with Myrna Wooders. In this essay we rank
economics journals based on the salaries of those that have published in those journals.
Previous literature that ranked economics journals used mainly citation rate, with
some sporadic use of ranking according economistsopinions. We introduce a novel
method to rank economics journals according to author salaries using a unique dataset
of 597 economics faculty from research institution across the United States.
We estimate the expected wage conditional on the number of publications in each
journal and other faculty characteristics. In addition, we introduce two methodologies
to calculate a publication. First, a publication by n authors counts as 1
n
publications.
Second, a publication by one author counts as one publication, two authors counts
as 2
3
publications, and n > 2 authors counts as 1
n 1 publications. Furthermore, we
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report results with two ways for treating older publications. First, a publication value
is constant over time. Second, a publication depreciates according to the Consumer
Price Index.
Our main nding suggests that the Journal of Political Economics and Economet-
rica are at the top of our ranking in almost all the estimations. The relative payo¤
to publication in those journals is worth an additional $16; 900 to $18; 800 above the
average salary, after controlling for faculty characteristics.
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CHAPTER II
STATISTICAL DISCRIMINATION AND THE IMPLICATIONS OF
EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RACIAL MATCHES
Introduction
In this paper, I test the empirical validity of a statistical discrimination model which
incorporates the employers race. The empirical literature consistently documents a
racial wage gap that persists despite the passage of more than 40 years since the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, which sought to eliminate racial discrimination in employment.
Statistical discrimination theories for such persistence have emphasized explanations
based on incomplete information about a workers productivity.3 In one version of
the theory, the nature of the incomplete information problem relies on the di¢ culties
an employer has in observing a minority workers skill.
Textbook examples of statistical discrimination emphasize that one mechanism
for obtaining group inequality is based on a race biased measure of skill observed by
an employer. That is, it is assumed that the nature of the communication between an
employer and an employee is such that a minority employee is at a disadvantage in
communicating his skill to the employer. In this paper I test whether an employer sta-
tistically discriminates less against an employee that shares the same race (hereafter
referred to as match) than an employee that does not share the same race (hereafter
referred to as mismatch). If an employer is better equipped to evaluate the skill of
3See for example the seminal papers of Phelps (1972), and Arrow (1973).
7
an employee of the same race, then the theory provides us with a clean empirical
prediction about the relationship between employees race, employers race and the
relationship between wages and skill.
Understanding the nature of racial wage inequality is important not only for the-
oretical implications but also for policy implications. If an employer statistically
discriminates less against a match employee, then policy makers can reduce the racial
wage gap by focusing on a¢ rmative action programs that help minorities become
employers.4 In addition, programs that provide cultural sensitivity training for em-
ployers to improve cross-race communication may also be useful.
To generate testable empirical predictions, I extend the basic model of statistical
discrimination proposed by Phelps (1972). In the model, when an employer estimates
a potential employees productivity, he uses observable characteristics of productivity,
such as education, and estimates the residual productivity using a signal. Therefore,
an employers wage o¤er is the weighted average between the group statistic and
the signal after conditioning on the observable characteristics. If the signal is more
accurate, then an employer puts more weight on the signal and less on the group
statistic, and vice-versa. To this standard setup, I add the assumption that a match
employer can communicate with an employee better than a mismatch employer. The
next section describes evidence from several disciplines supporting this assumption.
One of the goals of this paper is to test whether the theoretical implications of such
assumption hold empirically using economic data.
4A¢ rmative action policy that focuses on the employees side only can be expensive and ine¢ cient
(see Coate and Loury (1993), Moro and Norman (2003)).
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From this theoretical model, I derive two testable predictions. First, a match
employees wage should correlate with measures of skill more than a mismatch em-
ployees wage. Second, if the labor demand is perfectly elastic, then the probability of
working for a match employer should be positively correlated with measures of skill.
The intuition for these predictions is that a high skill employee prefers to be evaluated
by his true skill level and, therefore, prefers a match employer that can better read
his skill level. A low skill employee prefers to pool with his group rather than be
evaluated by his own skill level. Therefore, he is more likely to receive a higher wage
o¤er from a mismatch employer.
To test these predictions, I use data from the National Longitudinal Survey of
Youth 1997 (NLSY97). The NLSY97 contains detailed information about the respon-
ders employment. In particular, it contains information about the race/ethnicity of
the responders supervisor, who is used in this study as a proxy for the employer.5
The predictions in this study rely on the information an employer has about his em-
ployee. Therefore, a supervisor is a good proxy because a supervisor usually interacts
frequently with his employee and is directly involved in the evaluations. The data
consists of male employees, age 22 to 28 from the year 2007.
I use the Armed Force Qualication Test (AFQT) score as a correlate-of-productivity.6
Section 4 provides evidence showing that AFQT score is a good measurement of em-
ployees productivity, since it explains much of the racial wage gap and it is not
5In contrast, the earlier NLSY79 does not contain information about the supervisor.
6Neal and Johnson (1996) show that AFQT is a racially unbiased measure of premarket skill level
for responders in the earlier NLSY79. They argue that since the AFQT was composed of tests
the responders have completed by the age 18, it is not biased by discrimination and better than
postsecondary education which is endogenous and a¤ected by discrimination.
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a¤ected by the employees postsecondary education decision. Specically, AFQT ex-
plains 43% of the racial wage gap for men and 100% of the racial wage gap for women.
To test the rst prediction, I use the Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE)
based on Heckman sample selection estimation procedure because I estimate the
conditional wage by dividing the sample into match and mismatch subsamples.7 The
results show support for the rst prediction. For white employees, the e¤ect of AFQT
on wage in the match subsample is positive and statistically signicant and is greater
than the e¤ect of AFQT in the mismatch subsample, as the theory predicts. The e¤ect
of AFQT in the mismatch sample is small and statistically insignicant. For black
employees, the e¤ect of AFQT for the match subsample is 30% greater in magnitude
than the e¤ect of AFQT in the mismatch subsample.
To test the second prediction, I estimate the probability of working for a match
employer using probit estimation. The results show support for some selection of
employees in white-collar occupations based on AFQT, with the results driven by
white employees only. An increase in one standard deviation in the AFQT increases
the probability of working for a match employer by 4.9% more than an employee that
is employed in a non-white-collar occupation. However, the results do not support a
strong selection of employees with high AFQT score to match employers.
Putting together the results from the wage regressions and the probit estimations,
I nd evidence to support the prediction that a match employer better observes the
underlying skill level, but there is little evidence that a high skill minority employee
7Since the selection of employees to employers is based on the employeesskill level, each subsample
is not random. The Heckman correction technique corrects for such non-randomness.
10
selects himself to a match employer. These results imply that the demand of black
employers for high skill employees is elastic. That is, employers statistically discrim-
inate less against match employees, but black employees hardly select themselves
based on the skill level because there are not enough minority employers.8
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section summarizes the
related literature. Section 3 presents the theory that underlies the empirical results.
Section 4 describes the data. Section 5 presents the empirical methodology and
results. Section 6 discuss the results and tests their robustness to rm size and union
membership. Finally, section 7 concludes.
Related Literature
The theoretical model presented in this paper is built on Phelps (1972). In his
seminal paper, Phelps argues that statistical discrimination can cause di¤erences in
the wage schedule across groups in two ways. First, actual or perceived average pro-
ductivity across groups is di¤erent. Because employers base their wage assignment
to individual employees on the group average productivity, the average wages across
groups is di¤erent (see also Coate and Loury (1993) and Moro and Norman (2004)).
Second, members from the disadvantage group are at a disadvantage in communi-
cating their skill. Therefore, employers make more mistakes when trying to estimate
the skill of employees from the disadvantage group, and as a result, employers base
8This implication is also supported by looking at the summary statistics. The vast majority of white
employees (94%) work for white employers while only 30% of the minority employees are employed
by match employers regardless of AFQT.
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the wage assignment to members of the disadvantage group more heavily on the av-
erage productivity (statistical discrimination) and less on the individual employees
observed signal. This paper is mostly related to the second type of statistical dis-
crimination.
The main assumption of this papers model, that employers better observe em-
ployeessignals when their races match, relies on evidence from various disciplines
documenting di¢ culties in communications among members of di¤erent racial groups.
Lang (1986) summarizes a vast literature documenting evidence that miscommunica-
tion is more common for members of a di¤erent group (race, gender) than for mem-
bers of the same group. Similarly, Hecht et al. (2003) examine a number of studies
on racial di¤erences in communication. These studies nd that cultural di¤erences,
such as unique linguistic, rhetorical, and relational styles, contribute to lack of com-
munication (reading 3.1 pages 105-107). In the medical literature, Cooper-Patrick
et al. (1999) analyze physician-patient interactions. They nd that white and black
patients who saw physicians of the same race rated their physicians decision mak-
ing style as more participatory and were more satised than were patients who saw
physicians of a di¤erent race. In essence, physicians and patients communicate bet-
ter if both parties share the same race. Finally, Calvo-Armengol and Jackson (2004)
and Calvo-Armengol and Jackson (2007) summarize evidence in the social networking
literature that workers nd jobs through social networks. These networks are often
racially stratied (McPherson et al., 2001). If blacks are more likely to be connected
through a black social network, then a black social contact is more likely to refer a
black worker to a black employer. This referral can include additional information
12
about the workers skill.
The model presented here relates to a theoretical paper by Cornell and Welch
(1996). They make a similar assumption that an employer can better estimate an
employees productivity if the employee belongs to the same group. They show that
even if an employer does not want to discriminate, noisy signals lead to hiring discrim-
ination. Their model provides an implication similar to the rst prediction presented
in this paper. That is, in Cornell and Welchs model, a noisy signal leads to a lower
probability of been hired whereas in this paper, it leads to a lower wage.
This paper also belongs to a literature aimed at testing implications of statistical
discrimination models in the reduced form. Dickinson and Oaxaca (2009) report
results from controlled laboratory experiments. They nd support for statistical
discrimination in a labor market where employers are risk averse. Oettinger (1996)
develops a dynamic model of statistical discrimination based on Phelps (1972), which
he then tests using data from the NLSY79. In Oettingers model, as experience
accumulates, black employees are less able to pursue new job o¤ers that would result in
a higher wage. That is because black employees su¤er from statistical discrimination
at hiring and by moving to a new employer, they are more likely to receive a smaller
wage o¤er than the wage paid by the current employer that learned their productivity.
His empirical ndings mainly support this theoretical prediction. Oettinger, however,
is primarily interested in the dynamics of statistical discrimination and does not
control for employersrace. In addition, Oettinger does not control for unobserved
indicators of productivity, such as AFQT, so his implications are di¤erent than the
ones pursued in this paper.
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Altonji and Pierret (2001) incorporate unobservable indicators of productivity
into a model of statistical discrimination, as I do here. In their model, employ-
ers statistically discriminate at hiring, basing decisions on easily observable, biased
measurements of skill such as education and group statistics. As employers learn a
workers true productivity, the wage should be more correlated with hard to observe
measurements of skill, and the gap in wages should fade away. Altonji and Pier-
ret nd some support for this proposition using data from the NLSY79. However,
they assume that information is common across rms and, just like Oettinger, do not
control for employers race. To my knowledge, this is the rst paper analyzing the
relationship between the employers race, the workers race, measures of productivity
and wages.
A Model of Statistical Discrimination with Employers Race
To illustrate the theoretical basis for the empirical work presented in this paper,
I extend Phelps (1972) basic model of statistical discrimination by incorporating the
employers race. There is a continuum of employees and n employers.9 Each em-
ployee and each employer belong to one group (race/ethnicity). A couple (employee,
employer) either belongs to the same group (s), or belongs to di¤erent groups (d).
Each employee has an unobserved (by employers) skill level, , drawn from a
normal distribution, which is identical for both groups i.e.,   N(m; 2). This
9The assumption of nal number of employers can be relaxed. However, in the second part of
the theoretical model, I test the implications of the model when n is smaller than the number of
employees.
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assumption can easily be changed, and in the empirical section I control for groups
indicators. An employer does not observe the employees skill, but instead observes
a noisy signal of skill () for each worker. This signal may contain impressions from
the interview, chemistry and letters of recommendation, for example. Let i = + "i
where i 2 fs , dg; and "i  N(0; 2i ); is independent of skill, and for simplicity, "s is
independent of "d.
Based on the employees skill level (), a match employer and a mismatch employer
draw a di¤erent signal (s and d).10 I assume that a match employer better observes
the signal than a mismatch employer, or 2d > 
2
s: This assumption is essential to get
di¤erences in the wage schedule between match employers and mismatch employers.
The previous section provides evidence from multiple disciplines including economics,
psychology and medicine to support this assumption.
Employers are risk neutral, compete in the labor market for workers in Bertrand
competition, and simultaneously announce wage o¤ers as a function of the observed
signal and employees race. Thus, an employer wage strategy is a mapping w(i) : R
x fs; dg ! R+: Each employee observes wage o¤ers, and for this part I assume the
o¤ers come from match and mismatch employers, and then the employee accepts one
o¤er and rejects the others. Thus, an employees strategy is a mapping Rn+ ! fs; dg.
I assume that an employee chooses to work for an employer that o¤ers the highest
wage.
10The number of o¤ers is not crucial for determining the wage schedule. However, it might e¤ect the
selection of employees to employers based on the skill level as I discuss bellow.
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Therefore, the wage schedule is:
w(i) = E(ji) =

2i
2i + 
2

m+

2
2i + 
2

i (1)
i 2 fs; dg:
Appendix A contains a detailed derivation of equation (1). From equation (1),
I conclude that the wage o¤er is the weighted average between the unconditional
expected group skill (m) and the individual employees observed signal (). Thus, if
the signal is more accurate to a match employer, then a match employer puts more
weight on the signal and less on the group average statistics.11
Note that equation (1) can also be written as:
w(i) = (1  2i )m+ 2i (+ "i) = (1  2i )m+ 2i+ 2i "i (2)
i 2 fs; dg
where 2i =
2
2i+
2 is the square correlation between the signal and the true skill
(productivity).
From equation (2) I conclude the following proposition:
Proposition 1 If employers can better read signals of productivity from employees
that share the same race as the employer, then the e¤ect of true productivity on the
wage correlates more for a match employee than for a mismatch employee.
11Using the law of iterated expectations, one can easily show that the unconditional expected wage for
a match employee is equal to the unconditional expected wage for a mismatch employee (E [w(s)] =
E [w(d)]). I discuss below why this unrealistic result does not change the empirical implications.
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Proposition 1 suggests that if a match employer statistically discriminates less
than a mismatch employer (by putting less weight on the group statistic), then the
weight of true productivity on the wage o¤er is higher for a match employer than for a
mismatch employer. This is shown in Figure 1(a). In the gure, the dashed (solid) line
represents the wage o¤er as a function of the signal observed by a mismatch (match)
employer. Employees observe the wage o¤ers and choose which o¤er to accept. Since,
by assumption an employees utility is equal to the wage, an employee accepts the
higher wage. Figure 1(b) presents the accepted wage with a solid line.
Figure 1: The E¤ect of Signal on Wage: Theory
Mismatch
Signal
Wage
(a) Wage Offer
Match
E[wage]
Mismatch
Signal
Wage
(b) Wage Accept
Match
E[wage]
Therefore, an employee chooses to work for a match employer if w(s)  w(d):
After substituting (2) and reorganizing, the inequality is:
2d"d   2s"s  (2d   2s)p+ (2s   2d):
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Since "s and "d are assumed to be independent, it follows that:
2d"d   2s"s  N(0; 4d2d + 4s2s): (3)
Therefore, the probability that the wage o¤er made by a match employer is greater
than the wage o¤er made by a mismatch employer is:
Pr[matchj] = Pr[w(s)  w(d)j] = (4)
Pr[(1  2s)m+ 2s+ 2s"s  (1  2d)m+ 2d+ 2d"d]
From the result obtained in (3), I conclude the following probability:
Pr[matchj] = 
 
(2d   2s)p+ (2s   2d)p
4d
2
d + 
4
s
2
s
!
: (5)
From equation (5) I conclude the following proposition:
Proposition 2 If employers can better read signals of productivity from employees
that share the same race as the employer and labor demand is completely elastic, then
a highly productive worker is more likely to work for an employer of the same race.
Proof. The proof is straightforward. Notice that the derivative of equation (5) with
respect to  is:
@ Pr[matchj]
@
=
(2s   2d)p
4d
2
d + 
4
s
2
s

 
(2d   2s)p+ (2s   2d)p
4d
2
d + 
4
s
2
s
!
18
Since 2d > 
2
s, it is easy to show that 
2
s   2d > 0. In addition, the second term
in the derivative, (); is non-negative since it is the normal probability distribution
function. Therefore, the derivative is non-negative.
There are at least three aspects of the model which are unrealistic. First, groups
with the same average productivity receive the same average wage. Various papers
obtained average group di¤erence by adding another dimension into the employ-
eesstrategy and making the human capital decision endogenous (see Lundberg and
Startz (1983), Coate and Loury (1993), Moro and Norman (2004) and Aigner and
Cain (1977)). However, extending the model in this direction would not change the
qualitative implications, which focus on the correlation between wages and signals
and not on average wages. Second, the model implies extreme segregation among
high signal employees and low signal employees. That is, employees with high (low)
signal are more likely choose to work for the same (di¤erent) race employers. How-
ever, one could add heterogeneity into the employeespreferences. For example, if an
employees utility also depends on a random variable (not observed by the employer)
measuring the preferences for working for a same race employer and workers are het-
erogeneous in this dimension, then the model would display more heterogeneity in
the racial assignment of workers to employers, but the basic testable implications will
still be valid.
Finally, in the model I have assumed completely elastic labor demand. In the
data, however, there appears to be a low share of minority employers which might
a¤ect the selection of employees to employers based on their skill level (Proposition
2). A simple extension of the model can account for such fact.
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Suppose the employee draws two employers.12 Each employer can be either a
match or a mismatch employer. The probability of drawing a match employer is ,
and a mismatch employer is 1 . Therefore, the probability that the employee works
for a match employer is equal to the probability of drawing two s employers or drawing
one s employer and one d employer, and the wage o¤er from the s employer is greater
than the wage o¤er from the mismatch employer. This probability is calculated as
follows:
Pr(matchj) = 2 + 2(1  ) Pr[w(s) > w(d)j] (6)
= 2 + 2(1  )
 
(2d   2s)p+ (2s   2d)p
4d
2
d + 
4
s
2
s
!
:
From (6) I derive the following proposition:
Proposition 3 If employers can better read signals of productivity from employees
that share the same race as the employer, then the selection of employees to employers
based on skill level is non-negative and gets smaller as  ! 1 or  ! 0:
The marginal e¤ect of skill level on the probability of match as a function of  is
highest at  = 0:5 and gets lower as  goes up or down. The extreme cases are when
 = 0 or  = 1: In these two cases, there is no selection of employees to employers
based on skill. In the former, all employers are mismatch employers, whereas in
the latter all employers are match employers. If  is small, a high skill employee is
looking for a match employer, but the probability of receiving a wage o¤er from a
12This analysis corresponds to a case in which the employee is selected by a human resource agency
and the employer is the one determining the wage.
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match employer is low. As a result, the employee is forced to accept the wage o¤er
from a mismatch employer. If  is high, a low skill employee wants to work for a
mismatch employer but is less likely to nd one. As a result, the employee is forced
to work for a match employer, which suggests that the e¤ect of skill on the probability
of working for a match employer is low.
Propositions 2 and 3 look at the selection of employees based on their skill and
the probability of receiving a wage o¤er from an employer. Specically, proposition 2
suggests that if an employee can always receive wage o¤ers from match employers and
mismatch employers, then a highly productive employee selects himself into a match
employer. Proposition 3 suggests that if the probability of receiving a wage o¤er from
either a match or a mismatch employer is low, then the selection of employees to
employers based on skill is low. In particular, if the proportion of black employers
is too small to accommodate the demand for black employers, then the selection is
small for both white and black employees.
Data
The data is taken from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 (NLSY97).
The NLSY97 is a nationally representative sample of 6,748 youths from the U.S. pop-
ulation who were 12 to 16 years old in December 31, 1996. I also use the supplemental
over-sample of 2,236 Hispanic and black of the same age group. Since 1997, the re-
sponders have been interviewed annually.
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The sample used in this study is from the interview results from the most recent
year available to date: 2007. In the data, all responders are between 22 and 28 years of
age. In addition, the sample is limited to male responders who are employed full time,
who work at least 30 hours per week and who are not enrolled in school.13 Therefore,
the sample represents young employees, the majority of whom have completed their
education and are fully engaged in the job market.
The NLSY97 is more detailed than the previous NLSY79 and includes information
about the supervisors race together with the respondents race. With this information
I build a variable,match, that indicates whether or not the worker has the same race as
the supervisor (proxy for employer). In addition, I observe the race of the responders
spouse (dened as wife, husband, lover, or dating partner). I use this variable to
instrument for the selection of employees into a match or mismatch employer in the
Heckman sample selection model.14 Table 1 presents summary statistics of the sample
used in the analysis.
The implications extracted from the theoretical model are based on information
the employer has about the employees skill level. Following Farber and Gibbons
(1996) and Altonji and Pierret (2001), I use the Armed Forces Qualication Test
(AFQT) score as a proxy for the employees skill level.15 Unlike postsecondary edu-
cation, which is not compulsory and is obviously endogenous since it is determined
13Appendix B provides more detailed variable descriptions.
14See further discussion in the next section.
15About 80% of the individuals in the sample took the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery
(ASVAB). The ASVAB is a set of 10 tests of which four are used to calculate the AFQT: Arithmetic
Reasoning, Word Knowledge, Paragraph Comprehension and Mathematics Knowledge. I rst sum
these four test scores and then standardize the row scores to the responders age at the test in
cohorts of three months as in Neal and Johnson (1996).
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Table 1: Summary Statistics by Employees Race
Variable White Black Hispanic
Education 13.41 12.322 12.284
Age 24.891 24.913 25.072
AFQT (age adjusted and normalized) 0.306 -0.693 -0.425
(0.92) (0.92) (0.96)
Hours worked (weekly) 42.264 40.712 41.025
(8.31) (5.68) (5.60)
Wage per hour 16.282 13.066 14.541
(7.88) (7.59) (7.21)
# of employees in the rm 760 642 360
Big rm (# employees> 50) 44% 54% 54%
Union member 11% 20% 15%
Racial match 94.1% 37.2% 22.4%
White-collar occupation 37% 19% 25%
Partner match 89.1% 67.6% 68.1%
N 723 309 277
Standard errors in parentheses.
by ability, the AFQT score is composed of tests responders took between 12.5 and
18 years of age (i.e., before entering the job market) and therefore, is less a¤ected by
labor market discrimination.
Table 2 provides evidence showing that AFQT is a good measure of premarket
skill level by regressing log wage on AFQT. The analysis in Table 2 replicates the main
results obtained in Neal and Johnson (1996), but with the newer sample. Neal and
Johnson use a sample from the earlier NLSY79 for the years 1990-1991. They argue
that AFQT can explain about 70% of the racial wage gap for men and the entire
racial wage gap for women.16 My results using the more recent sample show that
when I control for race/ethnicity indicators and age (column 1 for men and column 4
16Since the sample used in this paper is from NLSY97, which consists of a di¤erent set of responders,
I perform separate analyses for a sample of men dened using the criteria described above and in
more details in the appendix and an additional sample of women dened using the same criteria
established for the men.
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for women), the racial wage gap is high for men (-0.221) and women (-0.156). After
controlling for education (column 2 for men and column 5 for women), which is a
biased proxy for skill, the racial wage gap drops, but is still present and statistically
signicant (-0.175 for men and -0.0868 for women). When I control for AFQT score
instead (column 3 for men and column 6 for women), the racial wage gap drops in the
set of men (-0.125) and almost disappears in the set of women (-0.0136). Therefore,
in this sense AFQT explains almost the entire racial wage gap among women and
about 43% of the racial wage gap among men.
A comparison with the results in Neal and Johnson (1996) reveals that after 16
years, the racial wage gap still persists. Although AFQT explains less of the racial
wage gap for men in NLSY97 than in NLSY79, it is still a good measure of premarket
skill level.
Empirical Methodology and Results
The empirical results are divided into two parts. In the rst part, I test the
empirical implications of the model regarding wages as suggested in Proposition 1.
In the second part, I look at the impact of employers race and employees race on
the selection of employees to employers based on AFQT, and compare the results to
Propositions 2 and 3.
25
Implication I: Worker and Employer Racial Match A¤ects the
Relationship between Wages and Skills.
I divide the sample into two subsamples: match employees and mismatch employ-
ees. For each subsample, I compare the estimated marginal e¤ect of AFQT on log
hourly wage. The objective is to test whether the e¤ect of AFQT on log(wage) is
greater in the match subsample than in the mismatch subsample, as Proposition 1
suggests.
When I divide the sample into two subsamples, however, a self-selection problem
might bias the results. Specically, high ability employees are self selected into match
employers. Since only a correlate-of-ability (AFQT) is observed, not true ability,
the selection is not random, resulting in inconsistent estimations. Therefore, I use a
maximum likelihood Heckman sample selection correction technique to account for
the endogeneity of the racial match between employer and employee.17
To estimate the Heckman MLE, I dene the following model with two latent
variables:
wagei = 0 + 1AFQTi +
0
2Xi + ui (7)
di = 
0Zi + vi
17The variable that causes the sample selection is match. If I use, for example, the Instrumental
Variable (IV) technique to instrument for the binary variable match, then the di¤erence between
the match sample and the mismatch sample is only in the intercept (because match is a binary
variable). However, the model predicts that the two samples di¤er in the slope as well (i.e., the
e¤ect of AFQT in the match sample is di¤erent than that in the mismatch sample). One could use
IV estimation by instrumenting for match AFQT: However, this would not show di¤erences in the
other coe¢ cients between match and mismatch.
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where Xi and Zi are vectors of individual characteristics,  and  are parameter
vectors to be estimated. ui and vi are jointly normally distributed, independently of
X; Z and AFQT, with zero expectations. di is the variable dening the selection of
employees to employers. If di  0, then the observed wage is the wage o¤er made by
a match employer while the wage o¤er from the mismatch employer is not observed.
If di < 0, then the observed wage is the wage o¤er made by a mismatch employer
while the wage o¤er from the match employer is not observed. The variable di is not
observed, but only an employees decision to work for match or mismatch employer
is observed. The vector Z includes all of the controls in X together with AFQT and
an additional variable that explains the selection (match).
The additional variable included in Z is a dummy variable that indicates whether
or not the workers spouse is of the same race as the worker. This variable should
not be correlated with the error terms, but is correlated with the workers decision
to work for a match employer or a mismatch employer. If a workers spouse is of
a di¤erent race, then this worker has a link to the social network of the other race.
This connection is likely to increases the number of jobs opportunities from mismatch
employers.
From specication (10), the conditional expected wage to be estimated is:
E[wageijj;Z; AFQT ] = 0j + 1jAFQTi +02jXi+jj( 0jZi) (8)
j 2 fmatch;mismatchg
where  is the correlation between ui and vi; and  is the standard deviation of ui:
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( 0Zi) =
(0Zi)
(0Zi)
is the Inverse Mills Ratio and () and () are the PDF and CDF
of a standard normal distribution, respectively. Therefore, if the coe¢ cient on  is
zero, OLS regression provides unbiased estimates. However, when the coe¢ cient on
 is not zero, OLS estimates are biased
From (10) it is clear that the mapping from Z to wagei is nonlinear. Therefore,
the excluded restriction imposed on the additional variable in Z in an IV estimation
does not binding in the Heckman. That means also that Z and X could be identical.
However, to improve identication it is better to include the additional variable in Z
that explains selection (Vella and Verbeek (1999)).
Spouse Race as an Instrument for Selection
Table 3 reports the marginal e¤ect of a spouses race on the probability of match.
For white employees, the coe¢ cient on the white spouse indicator is almost zero and
statistically insignicant. The coe¢ cient on the Hispanic spouse indicator is sta-
tistically signicant at the 10% level when I control for spouse race indicators only
(column 1), but is statistically insignicant when I control for individual characteris-
tics (column 2). However, white employees rarely work for mismatch employers (only
6%). Therefore, the selection is small.
The results for black employees indicate that a black employee with Hispanic or
white spouse is about 30% less likely to work for a black employer. The marginal
e¤ect of the black spouse indicator is negative and statistically insignicant. This
result may be attributed to a low number of black employers in the market. For
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Table 3: Marginal E¤ect of Spouses race on Pr(Match)
White Employees Black Employees
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
White partner -0.00103 0.00562 -0.267*** -0.292***
(0.0227) (0.019) (0.0682) (0.0658)
Hispanic partner -0.121* -0.0683 -0.328*** -0.346***
(0.0727) (0.0585) (0.0551) (0.0493)
Black partner -0.0562 -0.0527
(0.065) (0.0653)
AFQT 0.00167 0.00549 -0.0154 -0.0263
(0.0096) (0.01) (0.0335) (0.036)
Age 0.00561 -0.0296
(0.0056) (0.0236)
High school -0.0239 -0.112*
(0.0211) (0.0614)
College -0.0284 0.00564
(0.0256) (0.106)
Experience 0.00707 0.0379
(0.0096) (0.0403)
Experience2 -5.74E-05 -0.00345
(0.0009) (0.0047)
Urban -0.0456*** -0.0131
(0.0152) (0.0702)
Observations 723 723 309 309
Note- The dependent variable is match- indicating whether the employee shares
the same racial background as the supervisor. Partner is dened as the husband,
wife, lover or dating partner. ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Robust standard
errors in parentheses.
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example, if a black employee is connected to the black social network only, and there
are only few black employers and many white employers, he is likely to work for a
white employer. At the same time, that employee is more likely to work for a black
employer than a black employee whom is connected to the white social network. This
is evidence that for black employees, the spouse race correlates with match.
Analysis of the Wage Regression
Throughout the paper, I report two specications for each subsample: the short
specication, which includes only variables that are clearly exogenous, and the long
specication, which controls for education, experience and an urban indicator. I
prefer the short specication over the long specication since it should provide the
cleanest approach and it does not contain variables that could be contaminated by
discrimination, such as postsecondary education.
Table 4 presents the ML Heckman results for the entire sample. In the short spec-
ication, the coe¢ cient of AFQT in the match subsample is positive and statistically
signicant (0.119) and is 56% greater in magnitude than for the mismatch sample
(0.0762).18 In the long specication, the e¤ect of AFQT in the match subsample is
positive and statistically signicant, but is lower in magnitude (0.0825) than the e¤ect
in the short specication. In the mismatch subsample, the e¤ect of AFQT is small
18In the test of the hypothesis that the marginal e¤ects of AFQT are equal for both subsamples, the
test statistic is F (1; 1308) = 1:82; which suggests that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected with
the 5% or 10% certainty.
30
and is statistically insignicant.19 This suggests that the wage in the match sample is
explained by an unobserved correlate-of-productivity (AFQT) and observed variables
of productivity (education), whereas in the mismatch sample, the wage is explained
primarily by observed variables of productivity.
19In the test of the hypothesis that the marginal e¤ects of AFQT are equal for both subsamples, the
test statistic is F (1; 1308) = 3:00; which suggests that the e¤ects are di¤erent at the 10% signicance
level.
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Table 4: The E¤ect of AFQT on Log(Wage); Entire Sample
Short Long
Variable Match Mismatch Match Mismatch
AFQT 0.119*** 0.0762*** 0.0825*** 0.0267
(0.0165) (0.0262) (0.0176) (0.028)
Black 0.105 -0.185 0.0829 -0.0601
(0.0806) (0.2) (0.0873) (0.257)
Hispanic 0.235** -0.08 0.217* 0.054
(0.119) (0.221) (0.131) (0.293)
Age 0.0527*** 0.0547*** 0.0465*** 0.0322**
(0.0109) (0.0185) (0.0110) (0.0163)
High School 0.0696** 0.0169
(0.0330) (0.0427)
College 0.181*** 0.329***
(0.0438) (0.067)
Experience 0.054*** 0.0672
(0.0131) (0.047)
Experience2 -0.0047*** -0.0023
(0.0009) (0.007)
Urban 0.0436 -0.053
(0.0316) (0.0609)
Constant 1.373*** 1.344*** 1.339*** 1.582***
(0.272) (0.507) (0.267) (0.508)
 -0.226 -0.0067 -0.2039 0.062
(0.0767) (0.1264) (0.0877) (0.1698)
Uncensored N 857 452 857 452
Note- The data is taken from NLSY97 and includes the oversample of black and
Hispanic and contains 1,309 individuals. In all regressions, I use sampling weights
to account for di¤erences in probability of being selected into the sample. All
results are obtained using ML Heckman Sample selection correction technique.
AFQT is normalized and age adjusted in 3-month cohorts. Robust standard
errors in parentheses.  is the coe¢ cient on the inverse Mills Ratio.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 4 reveals two additional interesting ndings. The rst is the di¤erence in
the returns to having a college degree between match and mismatch employees. The
magnitude of the marginal e¤ect of the dummy variable college degree is greater in
the mismatch sample than in the match sample.20 This supports the conclusion that
the wage paid to mismatch employees is explained more by observable indicators of
productivity relative to match employees.
The second interesting result relates to the argument made by Neal and Johnson
(1996). When I do not control for employer type, as in Neal and Johnsons analysis,
AFQT explains only 43% of the racial wage gap (Table 2). When I examine the match
subsample alone, however, the coe¢ cient on black dummy is positive and insignicant
and the coe¢ cient on Hispanic dummy is positive and signicant. This suggests that
AFQT explains the entire racial wage gap when employees are of the same race as
their employers.
Analysis of the Wage Regression by Employees Race
The results in Table (4) assume that the marginal e¤ect of AFQT is the same for
black and white employees. In Table (5), I instead look at the wage regression by
race. Specically, I regress log wage on AFQT and other controls for white employees
and black employees, separately.
20In the test of the hypothesis that the coe¢ cients of college education are equal for both subsam-
ples, the test statistic is F (1; 1308) = 3:50; which suggests that the e¤ects are di¤erent at the 6%
signicance level.
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White employees (Panel 1) - The marginal e¤ect of AFQT is positive and statis-
tically signicant for match employees (0.118 in the short specication and 0.0846 in
the long specication). For mismatch white employees, however, the marginal e¤ect
is close to zero in the short specication, is negative in the long specication and is
statistically insignicant in both specications.21 These results partially support the
theoretical model. As the theory predicts, the marginal e¤ect of AFQT is greater in
the match subsample than in the mismatch subsample. However, AFQT does not
have a signicant e¤ect on the wage for mismatch white employees. One explanation
could be that mismatch white employees are employed largely in low skill jobs. For
low skill jobs, the employees skill level is not as crucial as for high skill jobs. There-
fore, the wage for a white employee that selects himself into a mismatch employer is
explained mainly by observable variables of productivity.
Black employees (Panel 2) - In the short specication, the marginal e¤ect of
AFQT for the match subsample is positive and statistically signicant (0.146) and is
greater in magnitude than the marginal e¤ect for the mismatch subsample (0.113),
which is also statistically signicant. However, in a hypothesis test, I cannot reject
the hypothesis that the AFQT coe¢ cient for the match subsample is equal to that
in the mismatch subsample. The results from the long specication do not show a
signicant marginal e¤ect of AFQT in either subsample: match or mismatch.
When I compare the results for black and white employees in each subsample
separately, I nd that the marginal e¤ect of AFQT for match employees is statistically
21In the test of the hypothesis that the marginal e¤ects of AFQT are equal for both subsamples, the
test statistic is F (1; 722) = 4:21; which suggests that the e¤ects are di¤erent at the 5% signicance
level.
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Table 5: The E¤ect of AFQT on Log(Wage) by Employees Race
Panel 1: White Employees (N=723)
Short Long
Variable match mismatch match mismatch
AFQT 0.118*** 0.0287 0.0846*** -0.107
(0.018) (0.0668) (0.0196) (0.103)
Age 0.0494*** 0.0848 0.0445*** -0.00884
(0.0122) (0.059) (0.0122) (0.0564)
High School 0.0972** 0.106
(0.0389) (0.185)
College 0.181*** 0.487**
(0.0484) (0.191)
Experience 0.0505*** 0.263**
(0.0143) (0.122)
Experience2 -0.00463*** -0.0354**
(0.001) (0.0166)
Urban 0.0434 0.0416
(0.0337) (0.216)
Constant 1.463*** 0.955 1.395*** 1.345
(0.304) (1.374) (0.296) (1.087)
 -0.2915 -0.1791 -0.2528 -0.1207
(0.0628) (0.1726) (0.0779) (0.2057)
Uncensored N 680 43 680 43
Panel 2: Black Employees (N=309)
Short Long
Variable match mismatch match mismatch
AFQT 0.146** 0.113** 0.0755 0.053
(0.0636) (0.0443) (0.0565) (0.0459)
Age 0.0666** 0.0969*** 0.0327 0.0570**
(0.0293) (0.0294) (0.0292) (0.0275)
High School 0.0462 0.051
(0.0914) (0.0755)
College 0.421*** 0.421***
(0.13) (0.131)
Experience -0.0318 0.0223
(0.044) (0.0626)
Experience2 0.0079** 0.00451
(0.004) (0.0081)
Urban 0.273*** -0.107
(0.0918) (0.0762)
Constant 1.049 0.341 1.571** 1.235*
(0.703) (0.73) (0.68) (0.699)
 0.4119 -0.3739 0.4453 -0.387
(0.1933) (0.1485) (0.1806) (0.1099)
Uncensored N 115 194 115 194
Note- The data is taken from NLSY97 and includes the oversample of black and Hispanic.
In all regressions, I use sampling weights to account for di¤erences in probability of being
selected into the sample. AFQT is normalized and age adjusted in 3-month cohorts. Panel
1 is restricted to white employees and Panel 2 is restricted to black employees. All results
are obtained using ML Heckman Sample selection correction technique.  is the coe¢ cient
on the inverse Mills Ratio. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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equivalent for black and white (the statistic is F (1; 1031) = 0:23). However, the
marginal e¤ect of AFQT for blacks in the mismatch sample is statistically di¤erent
from whites at the 10% signicance level (the statistic is F (1; 1031) = 2:83).
To conclude, the results suggest that the marginal e¤ect of AFQT is positive for
both black and white employees. In the mismatch sample for black employees, the
marginal e¤ect of AFQT is positive and lower in magnitude than the match sample.
In the mismatch sample for white employees, AFQT has no signicant e¤ect on the
wage. I draw the results in Figure 2.
Figure 2: The E¤ect of AFQT on Log(wage) by Match
Mismatch
AFQT
Log(wage)
(a) White Employees
Match
Mismatch
AFQT
Log(wage)
(b) Black Employees
Match
Implication II: Employee Skill Predicts Employer-Employee Racial Match
To test the second prediction, I use a probit regression to estimate the probability
that an employee and an employer share the same race, where the independent vari-
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ables are AFQT, education, urban dummy and experience. The objective is to observe
whether employees select themselves into employers based on AFQT, as Proposition
2 suggests, if there are enough match and mismatch employers to accommodate the
labor supply.
Table 6 presents the average marginal e¤ects using a probit regression. The esti-
mated marginal e¤ect of AFQT is almost zero and insignicant (column 1). However,
statistical discrimination maybe more likely to occur in occupations where the skill
level is important but hard to observe. Therefore, in column 2, I estimate the e¤ect
of AFQT for employees in white-collar occupations22 using a di¤erence-in-di¤erence
technique.23 The results suggest that for an employee that is employed in a white-
collar occupation, an increase of one standard deviation in the AFQT score increases
the probability of working for a match employer by 4.9% more than for an employee
that is employed in a non-white-collar occupation. In columns 3,4 and 5, I estimate
the probit regression for each race. The estimated marginal e¤ect of AFQT is statis-
tically insignicant for either race, even for employees in the white-collar occupation.
22This is not to say that the signal is not important in blue-collar occupations, but that the e¤ect of
statistical discrimination might be more substantial in white-collar occupations.
23As proposed by Ai and Norton (2003), the marginal e¤ect of the interaction term White-
Collar*AFQT was calculated according to the following:
F (match) =  (1X1 + 2X2 + 12X1X2 + X)
@F (match)@X1
X2
= (1 + 12) ((1 + 12)X1 + 2 + X)  1 (1X1 + X)
Where X1  AFQT; X2  White-Collar and X = other controls
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Table 6: Probit Model: Marginal E¤ect of AFQT on the Probability of Match.
All White Black Hispanic
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
AFQT 0.000799 -0.0135 -0.00415 -0.0339 -0.00884
(0.0153) (0.0158) (0.0113) (0.0389) (0.0297)
White-Collar -0.00491 -0.0248 -0.00877 -0.088 -0.110*
(0.0386) (0.0408) (0.0253) (0.103) (0.0607)
White-Collar 0.0488* 0.0462 -0.0542 -0.004
x AFQT (0.0276) (0.0356) (0.115) (0.0559)
High School -0.0557* -0.0522* -0.025 -0.123** -0.0231
(0.0286) (0.0281) (0.0205) (0.0619) (0.0508)
College -0.0299 -0.0455 -0.0298 0.0714 -0.0285
(0.0382) (0.0394) (0.0244) (0.122) (0.0873)
Urban -0.0708*** -0.0702*** -0.0459*** -0.0387 0.0656
(0.0257) (0.0255) (0.0145) (0.0731) (0.0644)
Black -0.645*** -0.648***
(0.0339) (0.0341)
Hispanic -0.774*** -0.774***
(0.0256) (0.0257)
Observations 1,309 1,309 723 309 277
Note- The data is taken from NLSY97 and includes the oversample of black and
Hispanic. In all regressions, I use sampling weights to account for di¤erences in
probability of being selected into the sample. All equations control for blue collar
occupation, age and experience in quadratic form. AFQT is normalized and age
adjusted in 3-month cohorts. Standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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When estimating the marginal e¤ect of a high school degree, a variable that is
easily observed by all employers, the marginal e¤ect is negative and statistically
signicant. This suggests that employees select themselves based on easily observable
characteristics of productivity. An educated employee is more likely to work for a
mismatch employer, which implies that the level of skill in the jobs o¤ered by match
and mismatch employers is di¤erent. In addition, the results suggest that a black or
Hispanic employee is more likely to work for a mismatch employer regardless of his
AFQT. These results are not surprising, since in the sample, 94% of the white are
match employees, while only 30% of the black and Hispanic are match employees.
The results from the probit regressions suggest a small selection based on AFQT
for an employee in the white-collar occupation, driven by the white employees. How-
ever, as noted above, a black or Hispanic employee is more likely to work for a
mismatch employer and a white employee is more likely to work for a white employer,
regardless of AFQT. Putting together the results from section IV.1 and IV.2, I con-
clude that an employer statistically discriminates less against a match employee, but
employees do not select themselves into employers based on AFQT. This suggests that
a high skill minority employee works for a mismatch employer even thought the return
from a match employer is higher, just because he cannot nd a match employer.
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Discussion
In this section, I rst discuss di¤erences between the theory and the empirical
evidence and then discuss alternative explanations. Subsequently, in section V.1 I
test the robustness of the results to rm size and union membership.
To compare the theoretical predictions to the empirical evidence, one can simply
compare Figure 1 and Figure 2. That is, the slope of AFQT for match employees
is bigger than the slope of AFQT for mismatch employees for both white and black
employees. However, the slope of AFQT for mismatch white employees is zero, and
the estimated coe¢ cients on AFQT for match and mismatch black employees are
noisy. One might argue that the results are driven by a "taste for discrimination"
Becker (1971) rather than statistical discrimination. However, if white employers
have a taste for discrimination, then the e¤ect of AFQT on wage for match white
employees should be identical to that for mismatch white employees and the only
di¤erence would be in the intercept, which is not observed in the analysis.
The probit model provides additional evidence to explain the di¤erences between
the theory and the empirical results. From the probit results and the summary sta-
tistics in the appendix, one can note that white employees rarely work for mismatch
employers, while black and Hispanic employees are more likely to work for mismatch
employers, regardless of AFQT.24 Using the notation in the theoretical model, this
implies that, in some places, white ! 1 and black ! 0. That is, minority employees
24Robb and Fairlie (2007) provide evidence that blacks have substantially lower levels of start-up
capital, which is correlated with less business formation. In addition, Blanchower et al. (2003)
report evidence that black owned small businesses are about twice as likely to be denied credit.
Both papers provide evidence that blacks have fewer opportunities for becoming employers.
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with high AFQT scores hardly receive wage o¤ers from match employers. Therefore,
they have to accept a low wage o¤er from a mismatch employer. Even if a black
employer is better able to assess a high skill black employees signal, which is sup-
ported by the fact that the magnitude of the coe¢ cient of AFQT is 30% greater for
match employees, there are not enough black employers o¤ering high skill jobs to
accommodate all of the black workers. The e¤ect of AFQT in the mismatch black
group reects high skill black workersemployment in higher paying jobs than low
skill black workers, mitigating the di¤erence in the marginal e¤ect of AFQT between
the match and mismatch workers.
The shortage of black employers also explains why the e¤ect of AFQT on wage for
mismatch white employees is statistically zero. The high skill jobs o¤ered by black
employers are more likely to be lled by black employees. A low skill white employee
looks for a black employer that cannot accurately read his skill level. However, the
low probability of receiving a wage o¤er from a black employer, force the low skill
white employee to accept a lower wage o¤er from a white employer. This is shown in
the low number of white employees that are employed by black employers (about 3%).
Therefore, the group of mismatch white employees is too small to make any statistical
inference (which is also supported by the high standard error of the coe¢ cient of
AFQT for mismatch white employees).
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Robustness to Firm Size and Union E¤ect
In this section, I test the sensitivity of the results to two e¤ects that might bias
the results. The rst potential problem occurs if the supervisor does not take part in
the wage/hiring decision. This might occur in big rms, where the direct supervisor
might have little inuence. Therefore, I test whether the results are robust to rm
size.
In the NLSY97, each responder has been asked to provide information about
the work place, including the number of employees working for the rm. I use this
information to create a variable big, which indicates whether the number of employees
in the rm is greater than the median number of employees in a rm in the entire
sample (50 employees). Then I estimate the same set of regressions presented in
table 4 using a di¤erence-in-di¤erence approach for AFQT and big. This specication
separates the e¤ect of rm size from the e¤ect of employee skill level on the employees
decision to work for a match or a mismatch employer.
Table 7 presents the results. For the match subsample, rm size has no signicant
e¤ect on the estimated wage. In addition, the e¤ect of AFQT does not vary between
big and small rms. For the mismatch subsample, the e¤ect of AFQT in big rms is
not signicant. However, the dummy big is signicant at the 10% level in the short
specication. Therefore, the results are robust to rm size, because in big and small
rms, the e¤ect of AFQT is bigger in the match subsample than in the mismatch
subsample.
The second potential problem is the inuence of unions. A few studies have em-
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phasized the e¤ect unions have on productivity (see Hirsch (2004) for a summary).
For example, Card (1990) argues that for most union members, wages are predeter-
mined and, therefore, do not change as a result of a higher signal. Since high signal
employees are more likely to be hired in the rst place, however, AFQT is expected
to have a positive marginal e¤ect on the probability of match. To test whether the
wage results are sensitive to union membership, I control for an indicator variable
union and the interaction between union and AFQT together, with the independent
variables as shown in Table 4.
Table 8 presents the results. A union members wage is about 20% greater than
a non-union members wage regardless of the supervisors race and AFQT. However,
the marginal e¤ect of AFQT is not signicantly di¤erent for union members. That
is, the e¤ect of AFQT for union and non-union employees is bigger in the match
subsample than in the mismatch subsample. Therefore, the results are robust to
union members.
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Table 7: ML Heckman Sample Selection Model: The E¤ect of Firm Size
Short (N=1,309) Long (N=1,309)
Variables Match Mismatch Match Mismatch
Black 0.0943 -0.429 0.0811 -0.117
(0.0818) (0.458) (0.0849) (0.491)
Hispanic 0.228* -0.378 0.219* -0.0157
(0.120) (0.521) (0.127) (0.570)
Age 0.0521*** 0.0580*** 0.0453*** 0.0333**
(0.0109) (0.0196) (0.0110) (0.0165)
AFQT 0.112*** 0.0341 0.0779*** -0.0102
(0.0234) (0.0388) (0.0244) (0.0354)
AFQT x Big 0.0121 0.0587 0.00746 0.0574
(0.0309) (0.0443) (0.0306) (0.0410)
Big Firm (# employees>50) 0.0455 0.0871* 0.0365 0.0745
(0.0310) (0.0512) (0.0307) (0.0540)
High School 0.0716** 0.0214
(0.0329) (0.0426)
College 0.183*** 0.325***
(0.0437) (0.0658)
Experience 0.0550*** 0.0598
(0.0130) (0.0471)
Experience2 -0.00464*** -0.00133
(0.000930) (0.00704)
Urban 0.0435 -0.0589
(0.0318) (0.0814)
 -0.2234 -0.182 -0.208 0.0228
(0.0785) ( 0.3067) (0.0842) (0.3427)
Uncensored N 857 452 857 452
Note- Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
 is the coe¢ cient on the inverse Mills Ratio.
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Table 8: ML Heckman Sample Selection Model: The e¤ect of union members em-
ployees
Short (N=1,309) Long (N=1,309)
Variables Match Mismatch Match Mismatch
Black 0.0870 -0.218 0.0711 -0.0570
(0.0827) (0.317) (0.0861) (0.352)
Hispanic 0.248** -0.112 0.236* 0.0646
(0.124) (0.362) (0.130) (0.406)
Age 0.0533*** 0.0493*** 0.0470*** 0.0284*
(0.0108) (0.0181) (0.0109) (0.0166)
AFQT 0.121*** 0.0758*** 0.0831*** 0.0262
(0.0173) (0.0279) (0.0187) (0.0288)
AFQT x Union Member 0.0384 -0.0167 0.0414 -0.0232
(0.0597) (0.0603) (0.0587) (0.0492)
Union Member 0.222*** 0.209*** 0.211*** 0.192***
(0.0541) (0.0627) (0.0537) (0.0581)
High School 0.0589* 0.0210
(0.0326) (0.0418)
College 0.178*** 0.334***
(0.0436) (0.0670)
Experience 0.0554*** 0.0596
(0.0131) (0.0444)
Experience2 -0.00469*** -0.00145
(0.000941) (0.00642)
Urban 0.0397 -0.0649
(0.0314) (0.0660)
 -0.2324 -0.0387 -0.2171 0.0535
(0.0804) (0.2131) (0.0861) (0.2383)
Uncensored N 857 452 857 452
Note- Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
 is the coe¢ cient on the inverse Mills Ratio.
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Conclusion
This paper tests whether match employers statistically discriminate less against
match employees based on the premise that match employers are better able to com-
municate with match employees. I rst derive empirical predictions using a basic
model of statistical discrimination. Then, I estimate the wage regression using the
Heckman sample selection technique and nd some evidence that employers statisti-
cally discriminate less against match employees. I then test the e¤ect of AFQT on
the selection of employees to match or mismatch employers using a probit regression.
From the probit regressions, I conclude that there is a small selection of employees
into match employers driven only by white employees.
Putting together the two main conclusions, I nd evidence that not all employers
behave the same. In particular, match employers put more weight on the correlate-of-
productivity than mismatch employers. In addition, I nd evidence that the shortage
of black employers contributes to the racial wage gap for men. Therefore, policies
that are meant to reduce inequality across race, such as a¢ rmative action, should
consider the race of the employer.
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Appendix
A. Proof of Equation (1)
Proof. We know i = + "i; where   N(m; 2) and "i  N(o; 2i ):
The employer estimates the workers ability based on the observed signal. Denote
^i =
\E[ji] as the estimated ability, conditional on the workers signal and the match
type i 2 fs; dg . Therefore,
^i  m = E[ mji] + u = i(i  m) + u;
where u is the error term from the employers estimation. The coe¢ cient i can
be written as
i =
cov( m; si  m)
var(si  m) =
cov(; si)
V ar(si)
=
2
2 + 2i
:
Therefore,
^i  m =
2i
2 + 2i
(i  m)
and
^i =
2
2 + 2i
i +
2i
2 + 2i
m:
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B. Data Collection
The sample consists of 4,599 men responders from 2007, the most recent year available
to date. To be included in the sample, responders must be either white, black or
Hispanic, but not biracial (208 fewer). I drop all responders who did not take the
ASVAB tests used to calculate the AFQT score (964 fewer). In addition, responders
must not be enrolled in school (419 fewer).
I consider only current employment data. Wages used are hourly rates of pay,
either calculated or reported. I consider only responders that have reported a su-
pervisor that is not biracial and is either white, black or Hispanic (1,577 fewer). I
consider only full time employment, so workers must work at least 30 hours per week
(80 fewer). If, in a particular year, a responder reported more than one job, I consider
only the job with the highest hours worked per week. If two jobs had identical hours,
I considered the most recent job. In addition, wage per hour must be calculable (80
fewer). To eliminate outliers, I consider only wages between $2 and $100 per hour
(33 fewer). In addition, experience must be reported (13 fewer). Using these criteria,
I am left with a cross-sectional sample of 1,309. The means, standard deviations and
frequencies are reported in Table 1.
To produce a proper representation of the US labor market, I use sampling weights
to account for di¤erences in probability of being selected into the sample. Sampling
weights are necessary in this study because I use the oversample of blacks and His-
panics.
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Table 9: Data Description
Variable Description
Wage Real hourly wage.
Supervisor race The reported supervisors race. If not reported, use the reported
supervisor race from previous year if employer ID is the same.
Partner match Dummy indicator, equal to 1 if the responder share the same
race as his spouse (husband, wife, lover or dating partner).
Hours worked Number of hours worked per week
AFQT Age adjusted and normalized AFQT.
Match Dummy indicator, equal to 1 if the supervisors race is the same
as the workers race.
High school Dummy indicator, equal to 1 if the highest grade completed by
the year 2007 is 12.
College Dummy indicator, equal to 1 if the highest grade completed by
the year 2007 is 16 or bigger.
Experience Number of weeks worked full time divided by 50.
Table 10: Means, Standard Deviations and Frequencies of Real Hourly Wage
Supervisor
White Black Hispanic Total
White Mean 16.29 16.76 15.66 16.28
Employee S.D. (7.91) (7.95) (7.03) (7.88)
N 680 22 21 723
Black Mean 13.17 12.68 14.31 13.07
Employee S.D. (7.82) (7.23) (7.71) (7.58)
N 173 115 21 309
Hispanic Mean 14.83 14.25 13.69 14.54
Employee S.D. (7.50) (5.94) (6.56) (7.21)
N 199 16 62 277
Total Mean 15.50 13.43 14.21 15.15
Employee S.D. (7.90) (7.32) (6.87) (7.78)
N 1,052 153 104 1,309
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CHAPTER III
GENDER WAGE GAP: DOES EMPLOYER’S GENDER MATTER?
Introduction
Over the past several decades, the gender wage gap has shrunk substantially in the
United States (Blau (1998), Even and Macpherson (1993)). Although women have
come a great distance toward achieving a wage equivalent to men, the gender wage
gap is still present and substantial. According to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics,
in 2009, women in all occupations who usually worked full time have earned a median
income of 80.2 percent of the median for men.25 Previous theories used to explain the
gender wage gap include: discrimination against women, di¤erences in skills between
genders, and lower workforce attachment of women. This paper tests whether the
gender of the employer inuences the gender wage gap.
Empirical results from Fadlon (2010) show that the race of the employer is im-
portant to understand the racial wage gap. In particular, Fadlon uses data from the
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 (NLSY97) to show that employees that
share the same racial background as their employers are paid more based on their un-
derlying skill level. The intuition is that communication is better between employer
and employee if the two share the same racial background than if they do not. In
this paper, I test whether Fadlons results can be extended to the gender wage gap.
25See also Blau and Kahn (2006) for a recent study documenting the slow down of the gender wage
convergence.
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Specically, I test whether employers who share the same sex as the employee can
better read the employees underlying skill level than employers of the opposite sex.
The data used in this paper is taken from NLSY97. NLSY97 contains detailed
information about employment including information about the supervisors gender,
which is used as a proxy for the employers gender. In addition, I use the Armed
Force Qualication Test (AFQT) score as a proxy for the employees underlying skill
level. To exclude bias due to racial discrimination, the sample used in the analysis
includes white employees and white supervisors only.
In the empirical section, I divide the sample into two subsamples: employees that
share the same sex as the employer and employees whose sex is opposite that of their
employers. Then, I regress log wage on AFQT and other controls in each subsample
to test whether the coe¢ cient on AFQT is di¤erent between the two subsamples.
The main result from the analysis suggests that there is no evidence that employ-
ers of a matching gender can read an employees underlying skill level better than
employers of an opposite gender. Unlike the results reported in Fadlon (2010), which
nds that the race of the employer partially explains the racial wage gap, the gender
wage gap is not a¤ected by the employers gender.
A potential explanation for the disparate results is that, unlike the racial wage
gap, social networks are probably not gender stratied. This means that employers of
one gender do not gain better information from the social networks about employees
of the same gender than they do about employees of the opposite gender. Another
explanation is that employer-employee communication is not actually better when it
occurs within a gender than when it is occurs across genders.
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The results from this paper have important implications. In particular, certain
a¢ rmative action policies that are e¤ective to reduce the racial wage gap might not
be as e¤ective in the gender wage gap.
The next subsection discusses related research. Section 2 describes the data.
Section 3 presents the estimation methodology and the results. Finally, Section 4
concludes.
Related Literature
The analysis in this paper focuses on how the correlation between a measure of
skill and wage varies by employer-employee gender matches. A few other studies
have looked at the gender di¤erences in the return to skill and its e¤ect on closing the
gender wage gap. Black and Juhn (2000) argue that females have better responded
to the rising skill demand in the 1980s and 1990s in the US. In the same notion,
Black and Spitz-Oener (2010) show that women experienced a larger increase in non-
routine interactive tasks and non-routine analytical tasks at the workplace, relative
to men. Other studies looked at the supply side and documented a relative increase
in supply of skilled females relative to males (see for example, Brown and Corcoran
(1997) and Blau and Kahn (1997)). In addition, the existing literature suggests that
relative improvements in female skills will continue to close the gender wage gap (see
Shannon and Kidd (2003) for a projection of the US gender wage gap at 2000-2040).
However, these papers do not consider the employers gender as a potential source for
the lower return to skill for women.
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This paper is also incorporates the concept of the glass ceiling. In this phenom-
enon, women are less likely than men to hold supervisory positions (Ichino and Fil-
ippin (2005), Mitra (2003)). If, as proposed in my model, female employers observe
female employeesunderlysing skill level better than male employers, fewer female su-
pervisors will mean a lower return to skill for female employees and a gap in wages.
Few studies have used a sample of employer-employee pairs. Bayard et al. (2003)
matched employees to employers using the New Worker-Establishment Characteris-
tics Database (NWECD), a part of the census. They nd that women employees
are segregated in lower paying occupations and industries. In addition, Korkeamaki
and Kyyra (2006) do a similar analysis with a dataset of Finnish employees. Al-
though these studies have information about the employer, they do not analyze the
importance of the employers gender, as I do in this paper, and instead focus on the
di¤erences in the occupations and industries in which men and women are employed
(occupational segregation).
Data
The data is taken from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 (NLSY97).
The NLSY97 consists of a nationally representative sample of the United States and
was collected annually from the same responders staring 1997. In this study, I use
the most recent year available to date, 2007. The data was collected using the same
criteria described in Fadlon (2010). In this paper, however, I include both genders
and restrict the sample to only white employees and supervisors to reduce the bias
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from racial discrimination.26 All regressions are adjusted using sampling weight to
produce a proper representation of the US labor market. The sample used is for the
year 2007 and includes 1,268 individuals, of which 680 are male and 588 are females.
Table 11 represents the summary statistics for the sample used in this paper.
The average AFQT in the sample is about 0.4 standard deviations above the
average AFQT in the entire sample because the sample is restricted to white respon-
ders. Women are more educated than men (14.4 vs. 13.4 years of education) and
score higher, on average, in the AFQT (0.48 vs. 0.315 standard deviations above the
mean). However, men earn more on average ($16.3 vs. $14.4 per hour). About 10%
of the employees are union members. Most responders (75%) live in urban areas.
Table 12 presents the means, standard deviations and frequencies of wage by
employer-employee gender matches. Most employees (71%) are employed by a same
gender employer. Females employees are more likely to be employed by a di¤erent
gender employer. This result is consistent with the literature on glass ceiling. That is,
females are employed in the lower rungs of the hierarchy within a rm, but they are
less likely than men to get promoted into management. Therefore, female employees
are more likely to be employed by male employers because most employers are males.
In addition, the wage paid to employees, male or female, is greater, on average, if
the employer is a male. This may be because women, even when they have been
promoted to supervisors, are more likely to be lower level supervisors of lower wages
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Table 11: Summary Statistics
Men Women
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Education 13.39 (2.50) 14.40 (2.44)
Age 24.91 (1.42) 24.95 (1.38)
AFQT 0.306 (0.915) 0.484 (0.786)
Hours worked (weekly) 42.3 (8.4) 41.2 (6.9)
Real Hourly Wage 16.29 (7.91) 14.34 (7.32)
Experience (weeks) 138 (121) 118 (109)
Supervisor Gender 0.14 (0.347) 0.548 (0.498)
# of Employees 796 (7,064) 553 (4,500)
Union Member 0.098 (0.297) 0.1 (0.3)
Urban 0.731 (0.444) 0.75 (0.433)
N 680 588
Note- Standard errors in parentheses.
Table 12: Means, Standard Deviations and Frequencies of Real Hourly Wage
Supervisor Gender
Male Female Total
Male Mean 16.52 14.78 16.29
Employee S.D. (8.17) (5.89) (7.91)
N 585 95 680
Female Mean 14.98 13.81 14.34
Employee S.D. (8.14) (6.52) (7.32)
N 266 322 588
Total Mean 16.04 14.04 15.38
S.D. (8.19) (6.39) (7.7)
N 851 417 1,268
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employees.
The gender wage gap is very apparent in the sample used in this paper. Figure 5
represents the wage distribution of male employees and female employees separately.
Figure 4, for male employees, and Figure 3, for female employees, represent the sample
distributions of AFQT by employers gender.
Results
To test whether employers gender is a signicant contributor to the gender wage
gap, I repeat the exercise from Fadlon (2010), but now I focus on the employers
gender. Equation (9) species the conditional expected wage used in the analysis
below. The objective is to compare the coe¢ cient on AFQT for employees that share
the same gender as the employer to that of an employee with a di¤erent gender than
the employer.
E[wageijXi; AFQTi] = 1 + 2AFQTi +03Xi (9)
I divide the sample into two subsamples: same and di¤erent employer-employee
gender match.27 Next, I compare the estimated 2 in the same-gender subsample to
that on the di¤erent-gender subsample. I rst estimate the conditional expected wage
for the entire sample and then I limit the sample to men and female employees only.
In both cases I estimate the conditional expected wage in two specications: a) short
26According to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, the female-to-male earnings ratios in 2009 were
higher among blacks (93.7 percent) and Hispanics (89.5 percent) than among whites (79.2 percent)
or Asians (81.8 percent).
27The results presented in this essay are from the OLS estimation. The results from the Heckman
estimation do not change the conclusions and are available from the author upon request.
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specication, where X is a vector containing age and a gender dummy, and b) long
specication, where X also contains education, experience and an urban dummy.
Table 13 represents the results for the entire sample divided into two subsamples:
employer-employee with the same gender (match) and employer-employee with op-
posite gender (mismatch). The results in the short specication indicate that the
coe¢ cient on AFQT in the match subsample is smaller than that in the mismatch
sample. However, in the long specication, the results ip and the coe¢ cient on
AFQT in the mismatch subsample is greater, in magnitude only, than that in the
mismatch subsample.28
The results when the entire sample is used do not provide a concrete conclusion.
Therefore, unlike the results for the employers race, when I use the entire sample,
the gender wage gap cannot be explained by di¤erences in the abilities of match
and mismatch employers to estimate a hard to observe measure-of-productivity. In
addition, the long specication reveals another interesting result. The return for a
college degree is greater for an employee that shares the same sex as the employer
than for an employee of the opposite sex.29
28In the test of the hypothesis that the marginal e¤ects of AFQT are equal for both subsamples, the
test statistic is F (1; 1267) = 0:26; which suggests that we cannot reject statistically the hyphothesis
at the 10% signicance level.
29In the test of the hypothesis that the coe¢ cients of College are equal for both subsamples, the test
statistic is F (1; 1267) = 4:00; which suggests that the coe¢ cients are di¤erent at the 5% signicance
level.
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Table 13: Log(Wage) by Employees Supervisor
Short Long
Variables Match Mismatch Match Mismatch
AFQT 0.130*** 0.180*** 0.0727*** 0.0551*
(0.0162) (0.0267) (0.0177) (0.0297)
female -0.207*** -0.00311 -0.229*** -0.0276
(0.0301) (0.0528) (0.0296) (0.0514)
Age 0.0497*** 0.0491*** 0.0426*** 0.0430**
(0.0102) (0.0183) (0.0104) (0.0171)
AFQT 0.130*** 0.180*** 0.0727*** 0.0551*
(0.0162) (0.0267) (0.0177) (0.0297)
High School 0.0543* -0.00832
(0.0329) (0.0644)
College 0.254*** 0.398***
(0.0398) (0.0608)
Experience 0.0594*** 0.0662**
(0.0126) (0.0267)
Experience2 -0.00520*** -0.00539**
(0.000962) (0.00219)
Urban 0.0343 0.0884*
(0.0297) (0.0532)
Constant 1.439*** 1.263*** 1.422*** 1.142***
(0.254) (0.455) (0.250) (0.428)
Observations 907 361 907 361
R2 0.124 0.121 0.185 0.255
Note- The data is taken from NLSY97. In all regressions, I use sampling
weights to account for di¤erences in probability of being selected into the
sample. AFQT is normalized and age adjusted in 3-month cohorts.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Analysis of the Wage Regression by Employees Gender
In this subsection, I estimate the same set of regressions as in Table 13, but I
derive separate estimates for male employees and female employees. Just as in the
previous section, the objective is to observe whether the coe¢ cient on AFQT in the
match-gender subsample di¤ers from that in the mismatch-gender subsample.
Table 14 represents the results for male employees. In both the short specication
and the long specication, the coe¢ cient on AFQT in the match subsample is smaller
in magnitude than that in the mismatch sample. This is in contrast to the racial
wage gap. In addition, the coe¢ cient on college education in the match sample is
statistically greater than that in the mismatch sample.30 These results suggest that
the wage of a male employee that is employed by either male or female employer is
explained by a hard to observe correlate of productivity (AFQT) and easy to observe
correlate of productivity. There is no evidence, however, that for male employees, an
employer of one gender can better observe the employees underlying skill level than
an employer of another gender.
Table 15 represents the results for female employees. In the short specication,
the coe¢ cient on AFQT is smaller in the match subsample than in the mismatch sub-
sample. In the long specication, the coe¢ cients on AFQT in the match subsample
is almost identical to that in the mismatch subsample and in both subsamples, the
30In the test of the hypothesis that the coe¢ cients of College are equal for both subsamples, the test
statistic is F (1; 679) = 3:07; which suggests that the coe¢ cients are di¤erent at the 10% signicance
level.
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Table 14: Log(Wage) by Employees Supervisor Male
Short Long
Variables Match Mismatch Match Mismatch
AFQT 0.123*** 0.156*** 0.0991*** 0.101**
(0.0191) (0.0384) (0.0210) (0.0470)
Age 0.0511*** 0.0666** 0.0468*** 0.0438
(0.0127) (0.0302) (0.0131) (0.0268)
High School 0.0810** 0.145
(0.0397) (0.102)
College 0.140*** 0.333***
(0.0521) (0.101)
Experience 0.0537*** 0.0739
(0.0148) (0.0687)
Experience2 -0.00477*** -0.00838
(0.000993) (0.00713)
Urban 0.0298 0.0430
(0.0359) (0.107)
Constant 1.407*** 0.840 1.345*** 1.130*
(0.316) (0.754) (0.316) (0.657)
Observations 585 95 585 95
R2 0.092 0.148 0.126 0.246
Note- The data is taken from NLSY97. In all regressions, I use sampling
weights to account for di¤erences in probability of being selected into the
sample. AFQT is normalized and age adjusted in 3-month cohorts.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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coe¢ cients are statistically insignicant. Therefore, just as in the male employees
sample, the results for female employees do not suggest di¤erences in the return to
AFQT based on employers gender.
Probit Results
In this subsection, I test the selection of employees to match-gender or mismatch-
gender employers based on the underlying skill level (AFQT). I use the probit esti-
mation to estimate the marginal e¤ect of AFQT on the probability that an employee
works for a same gender employer. If a match-gender employer can better observe an
employees underlining skill level than a mismatch-gender employer, I should observe
a positive coe¢ cient on AFQT.
Table 16 presents the marginal e¤ects from the probit regressions. The coe¢ cient
on AFQT is negative in all specications. When I control for AFQT only (column
1), the coe¢ cient is negative and very signicant. Even when I control for easy to
observe correlates of productivity (column 2) education and experience, the coe¢ cient
on AFQT is negative and signicant. However, when I regress the probability of match
gender for each employee gender separately, the coe¢ cient on AFQT is insignicant
for female employees and signicant for male employees. These results suggest that
there is no evidence that a high skill employee selects into a same gender employer
just because the return for skill is greater.
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Table 15: Log(Wage) by Employees Supervisor Female
Short Long
Variables Match Mismatch Match Mismatch
AFQT 0.149*** 0.191*** 0.0355 0.0409
(0.0304) (0.0344) (0.0327) (0.0391)
Age 0.0467*** 0.0425* 0.0326* 0.0399*
(0.0171) (0.0226) (0.0167) (0.0214)
High School -0.0373 -0.0681
(0.0567) (0.0817)
College 0.380*** 0.420***
(0.0600) (0.0745)
Experience 0.0785*** 0.0727**
(0.0250) (0.0298)
Experience2 -0.00714*** -0.00556**
(0.00236) (0.00239)
Urban 0.0663 0.0911
(0.0496) (0.0629)
Constant 1.297*** 1.418** 1.371*** 1.186**
(0.423) (0.558) (0.398) (0.533)
Observations 322 266 322 266
R2 0.091 0.116 0.261 0.268
Note- The data is taken from NLSY97.In all regressions, I use sampling
weights to account for di¤erences in probability of being selected into the
sample. AFQT is normalized and age adjusted in 3-month cohorts.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 16: Marginal E¤ect of AFQT on the Probability of Match Gender.
Entire sample
Variable (1) (2) Male Female
AFQT -0.0645*** -0.0424** -0.0516*** -0.0141
(0.0155) (0.0178) (0.0179) (0.0306)
High School 0.0354 -0.00320 0.0386
(0.0332) (0.0324) (0.0586)
College -0.0535 -0.0318 0.00543
(0.0343) (0.0386) (0.0523)
Experience -0.00192 0.00931 -0.0336
(0.0138) (0.0153) (0.0258)
Experience2 0.00108 0.000391 0.00327
(0.00138) (0.00164) (0.00282)
Urban -0.00904 -0.0517* 0.0334
(0.0298) (0.0270) (0.0484)
Observations 1,268 1,268 680 588
Note- The data is taken from NLSY97. In all regressions, I use sampling
weights to account for di¤erences in probability of being selected into the
sample. AFQT is normalized and age adjusted in 3-month cohorts.
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Putting together the results from the wage regressions and the probit regressions, I
conclude that the results do not support the proposition that employers gender mat-
ters to explain the gender wage gap in the same way that the employers race explains
the racial wage gap. However, the motivation for the importance of the employers
race to explain the racial wage gap is driven by the di¤erences in communication and
stratied social networks. Therefore, it seems as if the gender wage gap is not driven
by di¤erences in information between gender groups.
Conclusion
This paper aimed to test whether the gender wage gap is explained by asymmetric
information between an employer-employee couple that shares the same sex and an
employer-employee couple that does not, as the results in the racial wage gap suggest.
I obtain this result by testing whether the correlation between a measure of skill
which is not directly observed by employers and wage di¤ers if the employer and the
employee have the same gender than if they have opposite genders. The main result
from the empirical analysis suggests that there is no evidence that an employer of
one gender has more information about an employees underlying skill level than an
employer of another gender.
The results have an important implication for programs that aim to close
wage gaps. In particular, programs that might work for closing the racial wage gap
might not be as e¤ective in closing the gender wage gap.
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Appendix
C. Wage and AFQT Graphs
Figure 3: Kernel Density of AFQT by Employees Gender Match: Female Employees
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Figure 4: Kernel Density of AFQT by Employees Gender Match: Male Employees
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Figure 5: Kernel Density of Wage by Employees Gender
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CHAPTER IV
RANKING JOURNALS; SHOW ME THE MONEY
(WITH MYRNA WOODERS)
Introduction
Journal ranking plays an important role in evaluating institutions where economics
is taught and also in evaluating the quality of a candidates scholarship for hiring,
tenure, and salary decisions. Di¤erent methods for ranking journals have been used in
previous literature, including opinions of economists (Hawkins et al. (1973), Malouin
et al. (1987), Axarloglou and Theoharakis (2003)) and citation frequency (Liebowitz
and Palmer (1984), Laband and Piette (1994), Liner and Amin (2004)). In economics
departments, citation based rankings are frequently used, even though they can be
biased (see Palacios-Huerta and Volij (2004)). No ranking, however, has considered
the economic payo¤ of publishing in a particular journal.
In this study, we report a novel method of rating economics journals based on
salaries of economists as a function of publications. Specically, we estimate an
economists salary, controlling for individual characteristics and indicator variables,
for 36 economic journals. This method allows us to estimate the average marginal
e¤ect on conditional expected salary of publishing a paper in a particular economics
journal. A higher average marginal e¤ect may be viewed as an indicator of higher
market value of the publication.
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Our data comes from public universities from U.S. states that publish state em-
ployees salaries as part of public records. We were able to collect data from 26
universities that represent di¤erent tiers and geographic regions in the United States.
We restrict the sample to faculty members for whom salary is likely to be a¤ected
by numbers of publications and the journals in which these publications appear. (We
exclude data from universities that do not o¤er a PhD program in economics, for
example.)
We report on two di¤erent methods to weight a joint publication. In the rst
method, called per capita weighting, a paper that was published by n authors counts
as 1
n
th of a publication. In the second method, called upweighting, a paper by one
author counts as one publication, a paper by two authors counts as 2
3

s of a publication
for each author and a paper with n > 2 authors counts as 1
n 1 publications for each
author.31 We also report on two di¤erent ways to take into account the age of a
publication. In the rst method, called constant value, all publications in a given
journal are treated equally, regardless of their dates of publication. In the second
method, called decreasing value, we assume that the value of a publication decreases
at the rate of ination.32 At the top end of our ranking, the second method leads
to larger reported current worth of publications while at the bottom end, it leads to
lower current worths.33 Our ordinal rankings of journals are little a¤ected by which
31This particular scheme of taking co-authored papers into account has been proposed to us by several
colleagues at various institutions. It is, of course, ad hoc. With longitudinal data we could estimate
the e¤ects of numbers of co-authors on expected marginal contributions of publications to earnings.
32It would be desirable to estimate the rate at which the real value of a publication is a¤ected by time,
which would be possible with longitudinal data.
33It would be desirable to estimate the rate at which the real value of a publication is a¤ected by time
but, at this point, we do not have su¢ cient data.
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weighting is used.34
Using the decreasing value method, with both per capita weighting and upweight-
ing of co-authorships, in our ranking the top two journals are Journal of Political
Economy and Econometrica, with worths between $16,900 and $18,800 above aver-
age salary. Using the same weighing, the bottom two journals in our sample are
Economica and Southern Economic Journal, with current worths of approximately
$-6,900 and $ -13,500. It should be kept in mind that these worths are contributions
to average earnings of an economist in the sample and should not be interpreted as
assigning negative worths to publications; that is, a faculty member that publishes
mainly in these journals earns, on average, less than the average salary in the sample.
As we discuss later, our ranking correlates well with citation rankings.
We focus on ranking journals but, essentially, we estimate the average monetary
worth to a publication in a particular journal as it may be perceived by employers
(in our case, universities). Thus our paper also relates to a number of articles that
estimated the monetary value to a publication. Older literature that used a national
survey of faculty conducted between 1972 and 1973 by the American Council of
Education (ACE), use a limited sample that does not distinguish between journal
qualities (Tuckman and Leahey (1975)). A more recent literature estimated the return
to a citation (Diamond Jr (1986), Baser and Pema (2003)). However, estimating the
return to a citation does not distinguish between journals, but between articles.
34We have also, in an unreported study, taken into account elds within economics. Again, this leaves
our journal ranking relatively una¤ected.
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Data
The data for our study consists of 597 economics faculty from 26 economics de-
partments across the U.S. The data was collected from three di¤erent sources and
contains information about faculty members characteristics, publications and an-
nual salary. Individual characteristics such as the school of appointment, the date in
which the faculty member earned his PhD, position, gender and elds of interest were
collected from economics departmentswebsites. Detailed individual faculty publi-
cations, including date, number of authors and journalsnames were collected from
the website Econlit. Salary was collected from states that publish state employees
salaries as part of revealing nancial information.35 As a result, we focus on public
universities.36
The salary used in this study is gross pay for the academic year 2008-2009. We
restrict the sample to faculty members for whom publications are likely to have major
e¤ects on salary. We cannot directly control for the inuence of teaching responsi-
bilities on salary since we do not have a good measurement of the monetary rewards
to teaching. However, we restrict the sample to faculty members who do not hold
lecturer positions and we consider only universities with a PhD program (research
schools). About one third of the faculty members in the sample are employed in
schools that are ranked, according to the National Research Council (NRC) 1995, in
the top 20 universities in the United States.
35We did not take into account more than one year since information was not publically available for
all universities in the sample for the prior year(s).
36It would of course be desirable to have data from private universities, but we do not. Nor does it
seem likely that we will be able to obtain data
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The salary immediately after receiving a PhD is primarily a function of the po-
tential to publish and other individual characteristics such as the school in which the
faculty member earned his PhD. For this reason, we exclude faculty who received a
PhD after 2006. In addition, the Econlit database only contains publications since
1969. Therefore, our sample includes faculty members who earned a PhD in eco-
nomics between the years 1969 and 2006. To eliminate outliers, only individuals
earning at least $60,000 per year were considered.37 In addition, since the salary is
for the academic year 2008-2009, we include only papers published through 2008. In
addition, we excluded faculty who hold a dean position.
Table 17 represents the summary statistics for the sample used in this study. A
more detailed summary statistics table is available in the appendix. Gross salary
varies widely across faculty members with mean of around one hundred and fty-
one thousand dollars and standard deviation of around sixty-two thousand dollars.
The majority of the sample consists of full professors (58%) mainly because most
assistant professors do not pass the criteria discussed above. The average number of
publications is twenty-one with a standard deviation of twenty, where twenty-eight
faculty members in the sample have zero publications. These faculty members are all
assistant professors and earned a PhD between the years 2004 and 2006.
37 We lose 8 faculty members. The reason we eliminate only faculty from the lower tail of the
wage distribution is that for those faculty members, publications are less likely to determined salary.
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Table 17: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
9-month salary 151,630 (62,010) 60,685 482,666
year received PhD 1989 (11.377) 1969 2006
# of publications 21.22 (20.272) 0 146
full professor 57.8% (0.494) 0 1
associate professor 17.6% (0.381) 0 1
assistant professor 24.6% (0.431) 0 1
experience 18.48 (11.38) 2 39
chair 0.04 (0.197) 0 1
N 597
Methodology and Results
We rank journals in which at least 7% (40 individuals) of the faculty in the sample
published. This criterion allows for variations within a journal. We then use a simple
OLS method according to the following specication38:
wagei = 0 + 1Xi +
X
j
jPublicationij + "i (10)
where wagei is the annual gross salary for the academic year 2008/2009, Xi - is an
individual characteristics vector that includes experience in quadratic form, an indica-
tors for chair, a gender dummy variable, indicators for rank (associate, full professor)
and the rank of school in which the faculty member earned his PhD according to the
NRC 1995, divided into 5 tiers.
38This method is essentially the hedonic pricing method, since we observe the salary but not the
marginal contribution of a publication to the salary.
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Publicationij is the sum of faculty i publications in journal j. We report two
di¤erent weight methods for a publication: per capita weighting and upweighting.
We prefer the second method, since we found that faculty members, with whom we
discussed the paper, tend to evaluate a publication according to the second method.39
We take account of the age of a publication by assuming that the return to a
publication in journal j is depreciating according to the consumer price index (CPI).
For example, if a publication in AER is worth $10,000 today, then the increase in
salary to a ten-year-old publication in AER is the value of $10,000 today evaluated
ten years earlier according to the CPI. This means that a publication that is t years
old, accounts for 1
1+(t)
Publicationij where (t) accounts for the ination during the
past tth years.40
We do not control for the number of pages in an article, as has been done in
previous literature that ranked journals based on citation frequency. The reason is
that multiplying by the number of pages on Publicationij would imply that the return
to a ten page publication in a journal X, for example, is twice as much as the return
to a ve page publication in the same journal. We see no reason to suppose that this
is the case41.
Tables 2 and 3 present the results, where the main method, upweighting, is in
39These faculty members are all professors and have experience on committees evaluating the perfor-
mance of other faculty members in their own departments.
40Roughly, the situation we have in mind is when a faculty member publishes a paper, he either receives
a merit increase in salary or a job o¤er from another university, leading to a either a raise in salary at
his current job or a higher salary at the competing institution. This, of course, is only "on average".
It may take several publications before the faculty member receives a merit increase or a job o¤er.
Or universities may go through di¤erent budgetary climates, leading to money available for merit
increases in some years than in others. To the extent the universities implement across-the-board
percentage-based salary increases to make cost-of-living increases, the decreasing-value approach will
over-estimate the e¤ects of ination and lead to more variation in values of publications in journals.
41It seems to us that one can argue either way.
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Table 2 and the second method, per capita weighting, is in Table 3. Notice that the
coe¢ cient for some journals is negative and the constant term is relatively high at
more than one hundred thousand dollars. We stress that a negative sign does not
mean that the return to an additional publication in these journals is negative but,
instead, that faculty members who publish mainly in these journals earn less on av-
erage than faculty members who publish mainly in journals with positive coe¢ cients,
after controlling for other variables as described in equation (10). In addition, some
coe¢ cients are statistically insignicant. However, this is not a problem for the pur-
pose of our study since we care only about the average marginal e¤ect; when it occurs,
the statistical insignicance is due to high standard deviations which suggests wide
variation in marginal values of contributions to some journals (Quarterly Journal of
Economics, for example).
Of the top ten journals, ve journals do not surprise us: Econometrica, Journal of
Political Economy, American Economic Review, Review of Economics and Statistics
and Review of Economic Studies. One journal that placed unexpectedly low on the
list at number 13, is Quarterly Journal of Economics. However, for this journal the
standard error is large, which suggests that, even though the average marginal e¤ect
is relatively low, the marginal e¤ect varies substantially across faculty members in
our sample.
The top two journals in both weighting methods for co-authorships are Econo-
metrica and Journal of Political Economy. In these two journals the return to a
publication is between $16,900 and $18,800 above the average salary, holding all
other characteristics the same. A publication in the journal American Economic Re-
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view adds around $9,000 above the average salary, holding all other characteristics
constant. In this respect, our ranking di¤ers from others which place American Eco-
nomic Review at the top of the ranking (Liebowitz and Palmer 1984, Kalaitzidakis
et al. 2003, Hawkins et al. 1973).
Table 4 presents the results for the same specication as in Tables 2 and 3, but
without adjustment to CPI. This specication is accurate if the salary increment
is constant over time; that is, if a publication ten years ago worths the same as a
publication in the same journal today. In most universities, that is not the case. In
some institutions, however, salary is linked to the CPI, so the salary increment for an
older publication may be constant over time in real value.42
Publications might be rewarded with tenure appointments. That is, a faculty
member who does not have a tenure appointment is more likely to accept a lower salary
for a tenure appointment, either in the current placement or in a new institution. To
address this concern, we restrict the sample to faculty members who are professors
or associate professors. We nd that this hardly changes the ranking. Specically,
among the top ten journals in the restricted sample, nine are included in the top ten
journals in the full sample. In addition the rank correlation between the full sample
to the sample of associate and full professors is 86%.
The ranking is fairly consistent with previous ranking based on citations, even
though the methods are very di¤erent. The rank correlation between our ranking
and the ranking reported in Palacios-Huerta and Volij (2004) is 75% and with the
42With a larger, longitudinal data set we could estimate the e¤ects of time on the value of a publication.
We plan to do such estimation with another data set.
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Ritzberger (2008) ranking it is 61%. This suggests that journals that are ranked high
in citation based ranking are likely to be high in our ranking and vice-versa.
Conclusions
Some considerations may be important in interpreting the data and our results.
Our research aims to estimate the marginal work of a publication in a particular
journal in terms of the market for academic economists. Probably the rst mission
of an most academic economists is to earn a living. After some reasonableincome
(or tenure) is assured, many researchers may pursue their interests without regard
to whether they are working in a fashionable area of economics. Some work may be
deep, di¢ cult, and in an area only appreciated by a small percentage of economists.
This work may not have a high market value, but may still be highly regarded by
eminent researchers in economics. The market value of a publication is just that; it
should not be viewed as representing the intrinsic scientic worth of a publication.
(In our view, the same can be said of citations. Some papers appear to be widely cited
because they are much attacked, for example.) And we agree with those who think
that, in evaluating a publication, especially in ones own area, there is no substitute
to reading it oneself.
Our approach to ranking economics journals would benet from more data and we
plan to continue to collect data as it becomes available. In principle, with enough years
in the sample, we could estimate the average e¤ects of age on the value of a publication
in each journal. Another avenue, which we intend to pursue, is to estimate the e¤ects
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of quantity of publications on earnings. We could, for example, derive some one-
dimensional measure of publications and estimate a relationship between the numbers
of publications and the income (salary) distribution of academic economists.43
43This possibility was inspired by Albarrán, Ortuño, and Ruiz-Castillo (2009).
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Table 18: Journal Ranking, Decreasing Value: Upweighting
Rank Journal Coef. Std. Err. # Faculty
1 Econometrica 18,712 (5,692) 174
2 Journal of Political Economy 18,381 (5,657) 165
3 Journal of Monetary Economics 10,414 (3,853) 109
4 Review of Economic Studies 9,177 (5,621) 147
5 American Economic Review 9,167 (2,553) 290
6 RAND 8,451 (4,453) 75
7 Journal of Human Resources 8,441 (4,006) 64
8 Review of Economics and Statistics 8,396 (4,787) 158
9 Journal of Development Economics 7,546 (4,863) 55
10 Journal of Urban Economics 6,027 (3,000) 41
11 Economic Theory 5,772 (4,454) 92
12 Journal of Econometrics 5,636 (2,343) 99
13 Quarterly Journal of Economics 4,795 (4,867) 127
14 J of Economic Literature 4,060 (8,852) 55
15 J of Economic Theory 4,057 (3,663) 145
16 J of Business and Economic Statistics 3,943 (7,840) 55
17 J of Economic Perspectives 3,795 (5,017) 79
18 J of Applied Econometrics 3,279 (6,791) 51
19 European Economic Review 2,675 (6,164) 75
20 Journal of Public Economics 2,012 (2,296) 119
21 Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 349 (5,226) 76
22 Economic Journal -255 (6,273) 92
23 Games and Economic Behavior -266 (3,230) 55
24 Canadian Journal of Economics -995 (6,331) 56
25 Journal of Mathematical Economics -1,176 (5,643) 46
26 J of Economic Behavior and Organization -1,565 (2,831) 68
27 Economics Letters -1,976 (4,862) 139
28 International Economic Review -3,406 (5,965) 158
29 Journal of International Economics -3,483 (2,717) 72
30 J of Economic Dynamics and Control -3,769 (5,345) 75
31 Public Choice -3,889 (1,776) 48
32 Journal of Labor Economics -4,679 (3,857) 58
33 International J of Industrial Organization -5,368 (3,574) 49
34 Economic Inquiry -6,015 (4,728) 86
35 Economica -6,843 (9,851) 44
36 Southern Economic Journal -9,657 (5,219) 77
Not Ranked 795 (365) 525
Chair 26,921 (7,075)
Experience -2,068 (1,195)
Experience2 22.50 (26.16)
Female -2,623 (4,821)
Constant 102,410 (5,046)
Observations 597
R2 0.60
Note - Robust standard errors in parentheses. The column # Faculty reports the number of
faculty who published in the journal. A paper by one author counts as one publications, a paper
by two authors counts as 2
3
0
s of publication for each author and a paper with n > 2 authors
counts as 1
n 1 publications for each author. The regression controls for experience in quadratic
form, chair position, gender, associate and professor dummies, university xed e¤ects, and PhD
university rank, divided into ve tiers, xed e¤ects.
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Table 19: Journal Ranking, Decreasing Value: Per Capita Weighting
Rank Journal Coef. Std. Err.
1 Econometrica 17,113 (5,957)
2 Journal of Political Economy 16,938 (6,170)
3 Journal of Monetary Economics 11,308 (4,139)
4 Review of Economic Studies 4,663 (6,658)
5 American Economic Review 8,573 (2,695)
6 RAND 6,696 (4,357)
7 Journal of Human Resources 16,450 (4,477)
8 Review of Economics and Statistics 8,488 (4,968)
9 Journal of Development Economics 5,735 (4,537)
10 Journal of Urban Economics 6,772 (3,939)
11 Economic Theory 8,096 (5,366)
12 Journal of Econometrics 7,109 (2,320)
13 Quarterly Journal of Economics -4,015 (5,897)
14 J of Economic Literature -2,713 (9,515)
15 J of Economic Theory 3,025 (3,868)
16 J of Business and Economic Statistics 4,736 (7,868)
17 J of Economic Perspectives 5,576 (5,471)
18 J of Applied Econometrics 5,437 (7,930)
19 European Economic Review 3,264 (6,625)
20 Journal of Public Economics 5,564 (2,663)
21 Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking -26 (5,327)
22 Economic Journal 4,482 (7,403)
23 Games and Economic Behavior 1,668 (3,468)
24 Canadian Journal of Economics 3,062 (6,623)
25 Journal of Mathematical Economics -2,091 (6,315)
26 J of Economic Behavior and Organization 2,033 (3,297)
27 Economics Letters -3,029 (4,574)
28 International Economic Review 1,403 (5,813)
29 Journal of International Economics -1,142 (2,967)
30 J of Economic Dynamics and Control -3,062 (6,299)
31 Public Choice -2,532 (2,177)
32 Journal of Labor Economics -3,246 (3,736)
33 International J of Industrial Organization -4,539 (4,037)
34 Economic Inquiry -5,412 (4,716)
35 Economica -13,469 (10,026)
36 Southern Economic Journal -6,249 (5,235)
Not Ranked 581 (398)
Chair 28,838 (5,545)
Experience -840.0 (1,052)
Experience2 -0.91 (23)
Female -6,327 (4,386)
Constant 97,946 (7,928)
Observations 597
R2 0.67
Note - Robust standard errors in parentheses. A paper that was published by n
authors counts as 1
n
th of a publication. The regression controls for experience
in quadratic form, chair position, gender, associate and professor dummies,
university xed e¤ects, and PhD university rank, divided into ve tiers, xed e¤ects.
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Table 20: Journal Ranking: Constant Value: Per Capita Weighting
Rank Journal Coef. Std. Err.
1 Journal of Human Resources 9,678 (2,787)
2 Journal of Political Economy 9,243 (4,110)
3 Journal of Monetary Economics 9,067 (2,933)
4 Econometrica 8,880 (3,822)
5 Economic Theory 7,026 (4,084)
6 Economic Journal 6,797 (5,702)
7 Review of Economics and Statistics 6,530 (3,428)
8 Journal of Applied Econometrics 5,357 (6,247)
9 Journal of Public Economics 4,695 (1,946)
10 American Economic Review 4,455 (1,855)
11 Journal of Economic Perspectives 4,037 (4,076)
12 Journal of Econometrics 4,008 (1,776)
13 J. of Business and Economic Statistics 3,580 (5,784)
14 Canadian Journal of Economics 3,550 (4,847)
15 Journal of Urban Economics 2,980 (2,385)
16 RAND 2,905 (3,004)
17 Journal of Development Economics 2,264 (3,331)
18 Games and Economic Behavior 2,132 (2,713)
19 Journal of Economic Theory 1,560 (2,578)
20 Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 1,059 (4,365)
21 J. of Economic Behavior and Organization 894 (2,581)
22 Journal of Economic Literature 463 (7,626)
23 Review of Economic Studies 113 (4,608)
24 European Economic Review 64 (4,480)
25 International Economic Review -688 (3,974)
26 Journal of Labor Economics -1,101 (2,603)
27 Journal of International Economics -1,171 (2,218)
28 Economics Letters -1,250 (3,525)
29 Public Choice -1,554 (1,471)
30 Journal of Mathematical Economics -2,688 (4,468)
31 Quarterly Journal of Economics -2,926 (3,517)
32 International J. of Industrial Organization -3,054 (3,456)
33 J. of Economic Dynamics and Control -3,097 (4,773)
34 Southern Economic Journal -3,709 (3,191)
35 Economic Inquiry -5,940 (3,281)
36 Economica -10,676 (6,293)
Not Ranked 404 (308)
Chair 26,941 (5,238)
Experience -744 (1,083)
Experience2 -12.9 (24)
Female -7,183 (4,498)
Constant 103,035 (7,747)
Observations 597
R2 0.65
authors counts as ((1/n))th of a publication. The regression controls for experience
in quadratic form, chair position, gender, associate and professor dummies,
Note - Robust standard errors in parentheses. A paper that was published by n
university xed e¤ects, and PhD university rank, divided into ve tiers, xed e¤ects.
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Table 21: Journal Ranking: Constant Value and Upweighting
Rank Journal Coef. Std. Err.
1 Journal of Political Economy 11,272 (4,002)
2 Econometrica 9,969 (3,819)
3 Journal of Monetary Economics 8,642 (2,875)
4 Review of Economics and Statistics 6,868 (3,285)
5 Journal of Economic Literature 6,451 (7,251)
6 American Economic Review 5,414 (1,810)
7 Journal of Human Resources 5,046 (2,624)
8 RAND 4,765 (3,083)
9 Economic Theory 4,728 (3,653)
10 Journal of Development Economics 4,119 (3,484)
11 Journal of Econometrics 3,609 (1,835)
12 J. of Business and Economic Statistics 3,291 (5,710)
13 Journal of Economic Perspectives 3,094 (3,814)
14 Journal of Economic Theory 2,862 (2,493)
15 Journal of Urban Economics 2,792 (2,004)
16 Journal of Applied Econometrics 2,792 (5,609)
17 Journal of Public Economics 2,546 (1,752)
18 Review of Economic Studies 2,500 (4,209)
19 Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 2,033 (4,337)
20 Economic Journal 1,758 (4,782)
21 European Economic Review 1,646 (3,989)
22 Quarterly Journal of Economics 1,596 (3,350)
23 Games and Economic Behavior 1,190 (2,521)
24 Canadian Journal of Economics 470 (4,602)
25 Journal of Mathematical Economics (637) (4,161)
26 Economics Letters (775) (3,830)
27 Journal of Labor Economics (2,294) (2,663)
28 J. of Economic Behavior and Organization (2,435) (2,196)
29 Public Choice (2,684) (1,185)
30 Journal of International Economics (2,785) (2,011)
31 J. of Economic Dynamics and Control (3,625) (4,326)
32 International J. of Industrial Organization (4,257) (3,063)
33 International Economic Review (4,375) (3,963)
34 Economic Inquiry (6,416) (3,391)
35 Southern Economic Journal (6,664) (2,937)
36 Economica (6,760) (6,146)
Not Ranked 500 (272)
Chair 24,190 (6,797)
Experience -2,128 (1,246)
Experience2 10.7 (27.6)
Female -3,987 (5,057)
Constant 105,485 (5,190)
Observations 597
R2 0.57
Note - Robust standard errors in parentheses. The column # Faculty reports the number
of faculty who published in the journal. A paper by one author counts as one publications,
a paper by two authors counts as 2
3
0
s of publication for each author and a paper with
n > 2 authors counts as 1
n 1 publications for each author. The regression controls for
experience in quadratic form, chair position, gender, associate and professor dummies,
university xed e¤ects, and PhD university rank, divided into ve tiers, xed e¤ects.
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Appendix
D. Data
In this appendix, I report the sample used in this study in more detail. Figure 6
represents the average salary by university rank. For full Professors, the trend line is
downward slopping, as expected. For Associate Professors and Assistant Professors,
it does not seem that there is a trend line. Table 22 represents the frequency of the
faculty in the sample by university and faculty rank. Table 23 represents the mean
and standard deviation of the salary by university and faculty rank.
Figure 6: Average Salary by University Rank
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Table 22: Frequency of Faculty Members by School and Rank.
school assistant associate professor Total
Arizona 2 5 10 17
Arizona State 3 5 15 23
Berkeley 4 7 26 37
DAVIS 5 10 11 26
George Mason 4 4 13 21
IRVINE 11 5 7 23
Illinois 5 4 13 22
Indiana 9 1 12 22
Iowa 4 2 11 17
Maryland 6 6 15 27
Michigan 9 3 20 32
Minnesota 5 3 13 21
North Carolina 7 5 10 22
Ohio State 6 4 18 28
Purdue 5 3 8 16
Riverside 5 2 13 20
Rutgers 1 6 17 24
Texas 5 6 13 24
Texas AM 4 4 13 21
UCLA 12 7 18 37
UCSB 5 1 15 21
UCSC 7 1 12 20
UCSD 7 4 19 30
Virginia 8 4 8 20
Wisconsin 8 3 15 26
Total 147 105 345 597
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